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Foreword 
World demand for energy is set to increase significantly in the next decades, 
spurred by economic and demographic growth, especially in developing countries. 
Unless current trends are reversed, this demand for energy will be met mainly by 
burning fossil fuel, at the cost of escalating emissions of carbon dioxide and the 
associated risk of global warming. To curb these emissions, action is needed more 
than ever to switch to low-carbon energy technologies.  
In the decade preceding the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear 
energy had increasingly been considered as a key electricity generation 
technology to support the transition of fossil-based energy systems to low-
carbon systems. Since the accident, several energy scenarios have been 
published by international organisations such as the International Energy 
Agency which continue to project a significant development of nuclear energy to 
meet energy and environmental goals, albeit at a somewhat slower rate than 
previously projected. At the same time, a large number of countries, including 
developing countries wishing to launch nuclear power programmes, have 
confirmed their intention to rely on nuclear energy to meet electricity needs and 
objectives to reduce carbon emissions. 
In this context, this report provides a critical analysis of the contribution 
that nuclear energy can make to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
evaluates the construction rates needed to reach projected nuclear capacities 
based on different assumptions regarding the lifetime of existing power plants. It 
then assesses the barriers to such projected expansion, in terms of technical, 
economic, societal and institutional factors. Another challenge for nuclear power 
lies in its capacity to address the constraints of an electricity mix with a high 
share of renewables, in terms of flexibility and load-following. The impact of 
new “smart grid” technologies on nuclear energy demand and supply is also 
analysed. 
Long-term prospects for nuclear energy are discussed in terms of 
technological developments, non-electrical applications of nuclear energy and 
new operational challenges which power plants could face in terms of 
environmental and regulatory constraints linked to climate change. A summary 
and conclusions are presented in the final chapter. 
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Executive summary 
Nuclear electricity generation is virtually free of direct (i.e. during 
operation) greenhouse gas emissions, but as with any generation technology, 
there are indirect emissions associated with mining, fuel fabrication, 
construction and decommissioning of the power plant, and disposal of the waste. 
Some of these activities can be energy intensive, and depending on the carbon 
footprint of the energy system where this activity takes place, lead to non-
negligible emissions of greenhouse gases. This report provides an in-depth 
analysis of different studies of current and future fuel cycles, based on life-cycle 
assessments or environmental product declarations. The analysis considers 
various parameters: quality of the uranium ore (low grade vs. high grade), 
enrichment technology (gas diffusion vs. centrifugal), carbon intensity of the 
energy used during the processes, etc. and concludes that nuclear power is a low-
carbon technology, with overall emissions of the same magnitude as wind or 
hydro electricity. 
The report begins by looking at various scenarios, published by 
international organisations and aimed at modelling transitions to low-carbon 
energy futures. In most cases, constraining the evolution of an energy system by 
limiting carbon levels in the most cost-effective way leads to a high share of 
nuclear energy. Projections published after the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
continue to show an important role for nuclear energy as a key contributor to 
low-carbon systems, even if its contribution is slightly reduced compared to 
previous estimates. The Blue Map scenario of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) 2010 Energy Technology Perspectives, which foresees 1 200 GWe of 
nuclear capacity by 2050, is then taken as a case study to evaluate the necessary 
new build construction rates that would be needed to meet this expansion. These 
rates depend on assumptions concerning the long-term operation of the existing 
nuclear fleet. These rates are compared to historical data concerning construction 
starts or capacity connected to the grid, and it is concluded, based on that data, 
that a large expansion of nuclear capacity is feasible. 
However, data from the past can only give a partial insight into the way 
nuclear energy can evolve in the future. The perception of nuclear energy by the 
public, and the constraints associated with this technology, differ greatly from 
those that were at play in the 1970s. The report therefore reviews all the 
potential barriers that could prevent nuclear energy from expanding to the levels 
foreseen by the case study projections. Financing and investment represent 
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probably the greatest challenges, since the upfront capital investment needed for 
the most advanced nuclear power plants represents a huge investment for a 
potential owner, especially a private utility in a deregulated market. The 
economics of nuclear power plant depend strongly on discount rates, the 
duration of construction, as well as political risks and electricity market 
characteristics that affect the operation of the plant as a baseload provider of 
electricity for 60 years or more. The report also reviews other issues which are 
often cited as challenges for the future of nuclear power: the set up of the 
necessary industrial infrastructure and supply chain, the availability of skilled 
labour, the issue of uranium resources, the siting of new plants – especially in a 
post-Fukushima Daiichi world, the issue of appropriate management of 
radioactive waste, the need for standardisation of reactor designs, and finally, 
public acceptance and institutional, regulatory and legal frameworks without 
which nuclear energy cannot develop. 
The report then addresses the specific challenge of operating nuclear power 
in a future energy system characterised by a large share of renewable 
technologies. In such an electrical grid system, frequency control, or stability, 
and balancing become issues. The case is made that an electric grid is more 
stable if it includes generating units with high inertia, such as thermal power 
plants and their turbo-generator sets. Nuclear would then be preferred to coal or 
gas from the point of view of emissions, and possibly security of energy supply 
too, if gas is imported as it is in Europe. As far as balancing is concerned, it is 
argued that even if nuclear is usually operated as a baseload technology, it is also 
capable of load-following, though this is less cost effective for nuclear power. 
Smart grid technologies, which could help reshape the electricity demand curve 
to level the load, would help to increase the proportion of baseload in the 
system, and this would be beneficial to nuclear power. 
Before concluding, the report examines the long-term perspectives for 
nuclear energy. Technological developments in the area of nuclear systems 
(Generation IV concepts such as fast neutron reactors and high-temperature 
reactors, small modular reactors, accelerator-driven systems) and associated fuel 
cycles (recycling, partitioning and transmutation) are ongoing. If successful, 
these developments would lead to an improved efficiency of nuclear power and 
use of natural resources. They would also open the way to new applications of 
nuclear energy which have the potential to displace processes that are currently 
based on fossil fuel, and therefore contribute further to the transition to a low-
carbon energy future. But new challenges also lie ahead if global warming 
effects cannot be avoided: heat waves and droughts for instance represent a 
challenge for thermal power plants sited along rivers, and which require large 
amounts of water for cooling. Increased environmental and regulatory 
constraints leading to the limitation of water withdrawal or limitation of thermal 
10 
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releases will need to be addressed, and this may require new technology 
developments and reduce the competitiveness of nuclear power. 
Finally, the report draws conclusions on the contribution that nuclear 
energy can make to the transition to a low-carbon energy future. It highlights the 
main barriers or challenges it needs to overcome to enable its expansion to levels 
where it can make even more significant contributions than it does today.  
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
The need to cut emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), notably carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from the burning of fossil fuels, is central to global energy and 
environmental policy-making. Despite the lack of a global consensus on future 
emissions reductions to follow the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, many OECD countries have adopted or are 
considering ambitious targets for emissions reductions in the period to 2050. 
This is largely driven by scientific consensus in the 2007 report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), which found that the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere will need to be stabilised at no more 
than 450 ppm to have a 50% chance of limiting the global world temperature 
increase to 2°C. This implies global cuts of 50% or more in emissions by 2050 
compared to the levels of year 2000, requiring nothing less than a revolutionary 
shift away from fossil fuels for energy supply, and particularly for electricity 
generation. 
Nuclear energy already plays an important role in limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions in the power sector. In 2009, it represented 13.4% of the world 
electricity production, the second largest low-carbon source behind hydro’s 
16.4% share. In OECD countries, nuclear energy is by far the largest source of 
low-carbon electricity, with a share of over 21% of the electricity production 
(IEA, 2011). Even in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, many 
governments consider that nuclear power can continue to play an important role 
in a low-carbon energy future, alongside renewable and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technologies. However, the share of nuclear energy in tomorrow’s 
low-carbon future will depend on many factors, which include national energy 
policies, public acceptance, economic environment, investment conditions, as 
well as the rate of commercial deployment of CCS and renewable energies. The 
Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan in March 2011, caused by an 
unprecedented earthquake and tsunami, has certainly clouded the prospects for 
nuclear energy. Belgium, Germany and Switzerland have announced or 
confirmed phase-out policies. Italy has abandoned plans for re-introducing 
nuclear power. Many more countries on the other hand have confirmed their 
intention to continue with new build plans, albeit at a somewhat slower pace 
than initially planned. This is the case for China, the Czech Republic, India, 
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Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. 
Under those circumstances, it is important to revisit the contribution that 
nuclear energy can make to the reduction of GHG emissions from the power 
sector. This report aims precisely at addressing issues that will determine the 
share of nuclear energy in tomorrow’s low-carbon future. It also aims at 
providing factual answers to criticisms concerning the effective contribution of 
nuclear energy to the fight against climate change. For instance, it has been 
argued by some that nuclear is largely irrelevant to reducing emissions, because 
capacity could not be expanded quickly enough or because of constraints on 
uranium supply or other inputs. It has also been argued by others that CO2 
emissions from fossil energy use in the nuclear fuel cycle could become 
significant, making overall emissions comparable to those from fossil power 
plants. 
To address these issues, the OECD/NEA Committee for Technical and 
Economic Studies on Nuclear Energy Development and the Fuel Cycle (NDC) 
established the ad hoc Expert Group on Climate Change and Nuclear Energy 
Build Rates in 2009 to carry out a study. This report is the final result of the 
expert group’s deliberations, and is addressed primarily at OECD governments 
considering the use of nuclear energy as part of their overall national strategy to 
meet energy and environmental policy goals. 
The project builds on existing work by the IEA and other organisations that 
have prepared energy supply scenarios which foresee a role for nuclear power in 
reducing CO2 emissions. The report aims to establish whether the assumed 
contributions of nuclear power are realistically achievable, or whether 
constraints on nuclear build rates or fuel cycle capacities will limit the role of 
nuclear energy. The interaction between increasing nuclear capacity and other 
developments in energy supply, such as the growth in intermittent renewables, is 
also examined. The study also addresses the question of how much indirect CO2 
is produced in the overall nuclear cycle, and the extent to which this could rise 
given the assumed increases in nuclear generating capacity. 
The report is organised as follows. 
In Chapter 2, various published estimations of indirect GHG emissions 
from nuclear power are analysed and compared. It is concluded that apart from 
studies which consider nuclear fuel cycles involving extraction of very low-
grade ore in a carbon-intensive electricity supply environment, nuclear power 
has indeed very low indirect GHG emissions, and these will become even lower 
in the future as the overall carbon intensity of the national energy mix decreases. 
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In Chapter 3, scenarios of nuclear energy capacity expansions are reviewed, 
including projections published after the Fukushima Daiichi accident which 
foresee a decrease of the order of 10% compared to projections made prior to the 
accident. The building rates for new plants needed to reach those projections are 
calculated, under different assumptions on long-term operations of the existing 
nuclear reactor fleet. 
In Chapter 4, issues that are key to the projected capacity expansions are 
analysed: financing and investment, industrial infrastructure, human resource 
and knowledge management, uranium supply and fuel cycle, siting aspects, 
radioactive waste management policies, standardisation of designs and public 
acceptance. 
Chapter 5 analyses the capabilities and limitations of nuclear power 
operating in an electricity system with a high share of renewables. The load-
following capabilities of present and future nuclear reactors are analysed, and 
the impact of “smart grid” technologies on the level of demand for baseload 
capacities is discussed.  
In Chapter 6, long-term perspectives for nuclear energy are given, from the 
point of view of its further contribution to a low-carbon energy future, as well as 
from the point of view of adaptation to new climatic conditions, in the event that 
significant climate change cannot be avoided. Technology developments, 
e.g. Generation IV or small modular reactor (SMR) designs are reviewed, 
operational and environmental constraints and new applications of nuclear 
energy are analysed. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7.  
The overall objective of the report is to present a factual analysis of the 
technical potential for an expanded nuclear capacity to contribute to reductions 
in CO2 emissions in the period to 2050. In doing this, it aims to contribute to the 
ongoing policy debates at national and international levels on the optimum way 
to achieve a low-carbon energy future in response to the threat of climate 
change. 
References 
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 2. Greenhouse gas emissions from the nuclear cycle 
Electricity generation from nuclear power plants is virtually free of direct 
greenhouse gas emissions, i.e. emissions from the nuclear power plant itself. 
However, as with all electricity generating options, there are some indirect 
emissions from the full nuclear energy cycle, i.e. those associated with mining 
and milling of uranium ore, the manufacture of enriched fuel elements, the 
construction and decommissioning of the nuclear power plant and the disposal 
of waste. These activities require power and fuel, and the associated emissions 
are indirect emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Most studies show that the overall indirect emissions from nuclear energy 
are rather small and comparable to renewable energy sources, such as wind 
power. However, there are some studies that suggest these emissions are, or 
could become, much greater than those from renewables, to the extent that 
nuclear power would not be able to contribute significantly to emissions 
reductions. This chapter aims to clarify some of the issues surrounding these 
studies. 
Assessments of GHG emissions from different energy sources fall into two 
main types: life-cycle analysis (LCAs) and environmental product declarations 
(EPDs). LCAs exist in different forms, but most evaluate all non-negligible 
inputs and outputs from each process involved in the relevant cycle throughout 
the lifetime of the facilities employed (e.g. including construction and 
decommissioning operations as well as operation), and assess the related 
emissions. The aim of an LCA is usually to produce an average or typical value 
for a particular technology. For electricity plants and their associated fuel 
cycles, the result is expressed in terms of emissions per unit of electricity 
produced. 
This necessarily involves setting some system boundaries, and the result 
depends strongly on the accuracy and completeness of the available data and on 
the assumptions made. One major source of variable results is that the same 
type of facilities in different locations or using different technologies may have 
very different inputs and outputs. As a result, different LCAs, even when 
prepared using credible methodologies and peer-reviewed, can often produce 
widely varying results. 
 17
 EPDs have been developed by industry to assess the emissions and other 
impacts that can be directly and indirectly attributed to a particular product 
(e.g. the electricity from an individual generating plant). Such an analysis 
includes actual data from the facilities that are actually used to provide the 
product concerned, rather than taking average or typical data for a class of 
facility. 
2.1. Life-cycle assessment of emissions from nuclear power 
Many contributions on the life-cycle assessment of nuclear power and 
other electricity generating plants have been published in the open literature. In 
some cases, the results of these studies contradict each other, as do the 
conclusions drawn from them. Most of the referred publications show that the 
overall indirect emissions of nuclear plants are quite limited, but a few studies 
argue that these emissions are heavily underestimated. In this section, a brief 
overview of published results as well as some qualifying remarks are given. 
A comprehensive review of published studies has been undertaken by 
Weisser (Weisser, 2007). A summary of his results is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Range of GHG emissions for indicated power plants 
 
Note: Figures in brackets are the number of studies considered for that type of technology. Note the 
factor 10 difference in the ordinate of the two charts. 
Source: Weisser, 2007, reprinted with permission from Elsevier. 
Another comparison has been made by the World Energy Council (WEC, 
2004). This sample of studies gives a range for emissions from nuclear power of 
between 3 and 40 g CO2/kWh. The European Nuclear Energy Forum’s SWOT 
analysis (ENEF, 2010) also provides several examples from the literature, such 
as the WEC study and an earlier study performed by the International Atomic 
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 Energy Agency (IAEA, 2000) which found a range for emissions from the 
nuclear fuel cycle between 9 and 21 CO2/kWh. Fthenakis (Fthenakis et al., 
2007) include low, intermediate and high results for lifetime GHG emissions 
from nuclear life cycles and conclude that the largest differences can be 
explained by different assumptions with respect to enrichment, construction and 
operation. However, detailed input data for these process steps are lacking. 
Important to mention is the work by Sovacool (Sovacool, 2008), who sets 
out to calculate a mean value for the overall emissions by averaging the global 
results of 19 LCA studies forming a subset of, as stated by the author, “the most 
current, original and transparent studies” of the 103 studies initially identified. 
However, a critical assessment reveals that a majority of the studies 
representing the upper part of the emissions range can be traced back to the 
same input data prepared by Storm van Leeuwen and Smith (Storm van 
Leeuwen, 2005). 
Storm van Leeuwen and Smith make use of data related to the extraction 
of uranium from very low-grade ores, which makes the extraction stage both 
very energy and GHG intensive. Their figures show a nuclear fuel cycle 
consuming more energy than the overall electrical energy output over a nuclear 
plant’s lifetime when relying on very low-grade ores in the long term. 
After careful analysis, it must be concluded that the mix of LCAs selected 
by Sovacool gives rise to a skewed representation of the different results 
available in the literature. Furthermore, since different studies use different 
energy mixes and other varying assumptions, averaging the GHG emissions of 
these studies is not a sound method to calculate overall emission coefficients, as 
it does not consider any site-specific information. Therefore, for current plants, 
the previously mentioned attributional approach used in EPDs is to be preferred. 
Beerten (Beerten et al. 2009), being aware of these earlier reviews, have 
tried to shed some light on the discrepancies between the different studies. They 
aim to give a detailed picture of the GHG emissions in the different process 
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle by comparing the results of selected case 
studies, reflecting the range of results available in the literature: Torfs (Torfs, 
1998), a Belgian study by Voorspools (Voorspools, 2000), Storm van Leeuwen 
and Smith, and an Australian study by Lenzen (Lenzen, 2006; 2008). 
In Beerten (Beerten et al. 2009), the GHG emissions are analysed together 
with the indirect energy use, since most of the emissions result from the use of 
energy in the different process stages. In the comparative analysis, the nuclear 
life cycle considered is that of a pressurised water reactor (PWR) without 
recycling of nuclear fuel. To disentangle the contributions of the different 
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 process steps to the overall result and to make a detailed comparison of the 
selected case studies, the consolidated results have been recalculated according 
to the same methodology, but using the inputs and assumptions of the original 
studies. 
As to the methodology used in the original studies, it was found that the 
assessment method for computing the energy and GHG intensity is a major 
cause of the diverging results. Although a high emphasis has recently been put 
on GHG emissions, the analysis in two studies was carried out using an energy 
analysis. One method to perform such an energy analysis is a process chain 
analysis (PCA). Such an analysis is detailed in that it considers energy used and 
emissions produced in each step of the chain, but can lead to a systematic error 
due to the arbitrary selection of the system boundaries. 
A second method is the input-output analysis (IOA), using cost and energy 
intensity data for each industrial sector involved. A simplified method based on 
an average energy intensity, in which the overall monetary cost is multiplied by 
an economy-wide energy intensity, is used by Storm van Leeuwen for a number 
of process steps. In addition, the scope of the studies is another important factor 
determining the overall result: not all of the studies take into account every 
process step. 
In two of the studies investigated, the GHG emissions themselves are 
calculated as a by-product of an energy analysis. Making a clear distinction 
between different primary energy carriers for all process steps involved, and 
identifying the GHG emissions for each step, as done by Torfs and Voorspools, 
results in a more accurate assessment of the GHG emissions. Computing the 
GHG emissions by multiplying the overall thermal and electrical energy inputs 
with single average GHG intensities, as performed in the two other studies, 
makes the results highly dependent on assumptions about the background 
energy system. 
When the GHG intensities are changed in line with other established 
studies, the results from Lenzen are significantly lowered from 57.7 g CO2/kWh 
(being their best estimate) to 32.3 g CO2/kWh (assuming an average European 
electricity mix and the use of natural gas for thermal power generation). For the 
Storm van Leeuwen study, compared to their own results of 117 g CO2/kWh for 
current day practices and up to 337 g CO2/kWh when relying on low-grade ores 
(presuming an all-nuclear electricity input), when the coal intensive background 
economy from Lenzen is used, the results become 236 to 800 g CO2/kWh. This 
illustrates the large dependence of the results on the GHG intensity of the 
background economy. 
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 The most important reasons for the very high emissions in the study by 
Storm van Leeuwen and Smith, in the case where low-grade uranium ores are 
used, are the high energy inputs for mining and milling, the hypothetical model 
used for mine site clean-up, and the very low extraction yield assumed. This 
results in GHG emissions from the uranium mining and milling stage 
contributing up to 70% of the overall result of 337 g CO2/kWh. 
In analysing the result for higher-grade ores (117 g CO2/kWh), it was 
found that the highest contributions stem from the construction of the power 
plant, the operation of the plant, and all downstream life-cycle steps, such as 
waste storage, decommissioning and final waste disposal. The main reason for 
these high contributions is the assessment method used for the construction 
stage, in which total construction costs are multiplied by the average energy 
intensity of the overall energy system. All subsequent downstream process 
steps, as well as operation and maintenance, are assessed using similar methods 
or are assumed to use a percentage of the overall construction energy, thereby 
leading to very high results. 
The results obtained by Torfs and Voorspools (7 to 18 g CO2/kWh, with 
7.7 g CO2/kWh as the best estimate for Belgium) are far smaller than those 
obtained by Storm van Leeuwen and are in line with other studies available in 
the literature. However, the scope of the study does not include storage and final 
disposal of waste. It also assumes an all-nuclear electricity input for enrichment 
carried out using energy-intensive gas diffusion technology, which results in a 
rather small GHG contribution from this step in the fuel cycle. 
The GHG emissions in Lenzen’s study (10 to 130 g CO2/kWh, with 
57.7 g CO2/kWh as best estimate for Australia) are higher than the results from 
the Belgian study, primarily due to the assumed GHG intensive high coal use 
energy economy. Significant emissions result from the enrichment phase (28%) 
and the operation and maintenance of the power plant (25%). The higher GHG 
emissions are also reflected in the higher energy use in the different process 
steps, which is mainly due to the use of an IOA-based assessment method, 
whereas a PCA was used for the majority of the process steps in the Belgian 
study. Lenzen bases his analysis on the literature overview provided by Storm 
van Leeuwen for some process steps in the upstream part of the fuel cycle. 
However, the resulting overall energy use and GHG emissions in Lenzen’s 
study are smaller due to a more correct assessment method of the energy use in 
the downstream part of the fuel cycle. When a European-type energy mix is 
considered instead of the coal economy assumption initially used, Beerten finds 
that Lenzen’s model yields a lower best estimate value of 32 g CO2/kWh. 
 21
 Finally, it is worth mentioning the recently published WNA report (WNA, 
2011) on life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions for various electricity generation 
sources. This report is based on a review of over 20 studies published by 
international organisations, governmental agencies and universities. The 
conclusions of this report in terms of life-cycle GHG intensity are summarised 
in Table 2.1. These are in line with the above data, and identify the enrichment 
phase (choice of technology, gas diffusion or centrifugal, and specificities of the 
electricity mix powering the process) as the main source of indirect emissions, 
and the main factor influencing the range of emissions. The report also cites 
construction of the power plant as an area where emissions are higher in the 
case of a nuclear reactor than for other comparable generating technologies, 
since nuclear reactor designs involve multiple safety barriers which represent 
additional civil works.  
Table 2.1: Range of GHG emissions from different electricity 
generation technologies 
Technology 
GHG emissions, in tonnes CO2 eq/GWh 
Mean Lower range Upper range 
Lignite  1 054 790 1 372 
Coal  888 756 1 310 
Oil  733 547 935 
Natural gas  499 362 891 
Solar PV  85 13 731 
Biomass  45 10 101 
Nuclear  29 2 130 
Hydroelectric  26 2 237 
Wind  26 6 124 
Source: WNA, 2011. 
 
Table 2.2 summarises the findings of the different studies cited above in 
terms of GHG emissions of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
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 Table 2.2: Range of GHG emissions from nuclear power 
Synthesis of cited studies 
Source of data 
GHG emissions for nuclear power generation,  
in tonnes CO2 eq/GWh 
Mean Lower range Upper range 
IAEA (2000)  – 9 21 
Lenzen (2008)  57.7 10 130 
Lenzen (2008)/ 
Beerten et al. (2009) 
30  
Torfs (98)/Voorspools (2000)/ 
Beerten et al. (2009) 
7 18 
WEC (2004)  – 3 40 
Weisser (2007)  – 2.8 24 
WNA (2011)  29 2 130 
2.2. Emissions from future nuclear fuel cycles 
As is clear from the above discussion, the most important factors 
influencing the future CO2 levels of different nuclear fuel cycle alternatives are 
the quantity of fresh uranium needed, the ore grade and the carbon intensity of 
the electricity used in the different process steps in the life cycle. The ore grades 
of exploited uranium deposits could decline over time, which would increase 
energy use in mining and milling. Conversely, diffusion enrichment technology, 
which uses more than 25 times more energy than centrifuge enrichment 
technology, will be phased out over the next few years. The generation mix of 
the electricity used in the different steps in the nuclear fuel cycle will most 
likely change towards lower-carbon emissions. The recycling of plutonium and 
actinides could reduce the need for uranium mining, and also reduce volumes of 
high-level nuclear waste for repository disposal. This would, however, require 
an extra stage in the cycle, that of reprocessing of spent fuel. 
The work by Wiberg (Wiberg, 2009) helps to clarify the issues on the fuel 
cycle. A slightly modified version of the emission profile for the Forsmark 
nuclear power plant (NPP) (as presented in its EPD, with once-through cycle) 
was used as the reference scenario in a set of future fuel cycle scenarios 
prepared by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 2006). These scenarios 
include different combinations of Generation III+ reactors and Generation IV 
reactor types chosen from the six selected by the Generation IV International 
Forum (GIF). Based on the emission profile of the reference scenario, the mass 
flows in the different fuel cycles and different carbon intensity of the electricity 
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 feeding the life cycle, Wiberg has made estimates of the CO2 emissions 
(Wiberg, 2009). 
The reference scenario has the following characteristics: Forsmark NPP, 
3 boiling water reactors (BWR), total capacity 3 158 MW, once-through cycle, 
uranium from the Rössing mine in Namibia with ore grade 0.028% U, 
centrifuge enrichment and electricity input based on national generation mixes; 
spent fuel is prepared for final repository in line with the Swedish concept; 
transmission and distribution to a 130-kV customer, distribution losses 3% 
(input data from 2006). 
If future ore grades follow historical trends, they will decline with higher 
CO2 emissions as a possible consequence. Hence, Wiberg has set up scenarios 
for two different ore grades, 0.01% and 0.001% (recall that in the reference 
scenario, the uranium originates from the Rössing mine, with ore grade 
0.028% U) (Wiberg, 2009). Furthermore, for the scenarios below, a best-case 
and a worst-case estimates are computed, based on different (opposing) 
assumptions. 
The studied scenarios are (Wiberg, 2009): 
• Open cycle Forsmark: The once-through cycle; spent fuel is prepared for 
final repository. “Similar” to the reference case, but now subject to 
different ore grades and other assumptions (worst and best cases). 
• Open cycle EPR: The once-through cycle, slightly smaller fuel 
requirements than Forsmark but higher enrichment; spent fuel is prepared 
for final repository. 
• Pu LWR: A partially closed cycle where plutonium is multi-recycled in 
light water reactors (LWR) reactors; other actinides are prepared for final 
disposal. 
• LWR+FR: A fully closed cycle, with LWR and fast reactors (FR); the 
nuclear waste consists of reprocessing losses and is practically free of 
actinides. 
Assumptions applied to design best- and worst-case scenarios are 
presented below: 
• Electricity generation mixes and fuels: In the worst-case scenarios, fossil-
based electricity feeding is assumed. In the best-case scenarios, electricity 
is provided from low CO2 emitting sources, such as hydro and nuclear 
power. Fuels used on site, the share of electricity in relation to gross 
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 energy use and electricity used to produce input substances are the same as 
in the reference scenario as well as all transportation. 
• Mass flows: The number of process operations required is assumed to be 
proportional to the uranium need in the different scenarios. For example, if 
the uranium need is 60% compared to the reference scenario, then the 
amount of conversion operations required has been set to 60%. The 
enrichment levels proposed in NEA (2006) are taken into account when 
estimating the separative work unit (SWU) requirements. 
• Energy use, mining and milling: To estimate energy use at the suggested 
ore grades, a simple regression equation has been applied in the best-case 
scenarios. In the worst-case scenarios, it has been assumed that the energy 
use was inversely proportional to ore grade. 
• Energy use, advanced fuel cycles, fuel fabrication and reprocessing: 
Fabrication of fast reactor fuels and mixed-oxide fuels (MOX) will 
probably be more complex than fabrication of uranium oxide fuels (UOX) 
due to technical challenges. Since no better guidance has been found, it has 
been assumed that the energy use associated with fuel fabrication 
corresponds to future cost estimates of that process in the worst-case 
scenarios, but would be equivalent to the energy use of UOX fabrication in 
the best-case estimates. A similar approach has been used for reprocessing 
with reprocessing of LWR fuel at La Hague, France (Ecoinvent database)1 
as reference data. 
• Energy use, other processes: No detailed assessment has been made for 
operations such as conversion and fuel fabrication for once-through cycles. 
Instead, the energy use is assumed to be doubled in the worst-case and 
halved in the best-case scenarios. The same applies to the operation/ 
construction of the NPP and the waste management (for all fuel cycle 
alternatives). Energy use associated with electricity distribution has been 
assumed to stay at the reference level, as it is not directly dependent on the 
fuel cycle. 
For an average ore grade of 0.01%, the highest value obtained in the worst-
case scenarios is 16 g CO2/kWh electricity delivered to the customer for the 
open cycle with LWR reactors only. However, in the best-case scenarios, the 
computed emissions stay close to the value of the reference scenario. The 
contribution of CO2 emissions associated with reprocessing is small but 
noticeable for the advanced cycles. The results are summarised in Figure 2.2. 
                                                     
1. Available at www.ecoinvent.ch. 
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 Figure 2.2: CO2 emissions for different fuel cycles for ore grade 0.01% 
CO2 emissions to air (g/kWh), ore grade 0.01% 
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 Source: Wiberg, 2009. 
Uranium extraction completely dominates in the worst-case scenarios at 
ore grade 0.001 %. Nevertheless, in the best-case scenarios, the results remained 
close to the reference level (see Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3: CO2 emissions for different fuel cycles for ore grade 0.001% 
CO2 emissions to air (g/kWh), ore grade 0.001%
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 Source: Wiberg, 2009. 
At an ore grade of 0.01%, nuclear power clearly belongs to the low-carbon 
technologies of today, even in a society dominated by fossil fuel electricity 
generation. In the case of an extremely low ore grade of 0.001% and fossil-
based electricity use, the nuclear fuel cycle will still emit one order of 
magnitude lower CO2 emissions than coal power. However, if society moves 
towards a CO2-lean or -neutral energy economy, the indirect emissions of 
nuclear power generation will gradually diminish. The same applies to most 
renewable energy conversion technologies. 
As discussed above, the life-cycle CO2 emissions per kWh end-use 
electricity from current nuclear power plants are low. Future technology 
development and decrease of ore grades may lead to different results, for better 
or for worse.  
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 Looking towards the future, it is important to distinguish between the near- 
to mid-term or transitional energy evolution (from now till 2030-2040 or so), on 
the one hand, and the longer term (> 2050 or so) when the energy economy is 
supposed to be grossly CO2 neutral, on the other hand. 
Current and near-term nuclear investments will be operational in a near-
future and transitional energy system, in which there will still be a considerable 
fossil fuel component in the energy mix. During that period, NPPs will not have 
to rely on extremely low ore grades, so that the indirect emissions will still be 
low to moderate. But even these non-zero emissions are negligible compared to 
the fossil-fired plants they will replace. Indeed, even modern fossil-fuelled 
plants without CCS emit of the order of 0.4 to 0.8 kg CO2/kWh (for natural gas 
CCGTs and coal-fired USCs, respectively; for lignite, the results are of the 
order of ~1 kg CO2/kWh). Even with CCS, which is not expected to be 
routinely commercially available before 2030,2 fossil fuel-fired plant emissions 
will still emit several tens of g CO2/kWh. In the time frame 2030-2040, nuclear 
power will still be a low-carbon technology, and what is more, the nuclear fuel 
cycle will profit from the CCS application in the electricity generation fuel mix. 
For the long-term future, even if there is a need for low grade ores, the 
nuclear fuel cycle becomes de facto carbon free since the background energy 
economy will be carbon neutral or almost carbon free. In the long run, nuclear 
remains a low-carbon technology. 
2.3. Nuclear energy’s contribution to today’s emissions reductions 
In 2009, nuclear represented 13.4% of the world’s total electricity 
generation, and over 21% of the OECD’s electricity generation (see Figure 2.4). 
The same year, direct CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuel (coal, natural gas 
or oil) for electricity and heat amounted to about 12 Gt (CO2), 4.7 Gt produced 
in OECD countries, and over 7 Gt produced in non-OECD countries (IEA, 
2011a; 2011b). 
                                                     
2. In the period 2015-2030, a reasonable number of pilot plants with CCS will be 
operational worldwide, which is different from being “routinely commercial” 
available, with a completely laid out CO2 transport grid and storage sites 
commercially accessible. 
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 Figure 2.4: Share of electricity production by technology in 2009,  
at world level (left) and at OECD level (right) 
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Note: Nuclear represents 13.4% of the world’s electricity generation, and over 21% of the OECD 
electricity generation. 
Assuming indirect emissions of 30 tonnes of CO2 eq/GWh3 for nuclear 
energy, the total emissions produced by nuclear power plants in 2009 would 
represent 0.08 Gt CO2 globally and 0.07 Gt at the OECD level. This is 
insignificant compared to the direct emissions produced by burning fossil fuel. 
Furthermore, replacing nuclear by coal (∼1 000 tonnes CO2 eq/GWh), gas 
(∼500 tonnes CO2 eq/GWh) or a nuclear-free mix such as that of a country like 
Denmark (∼300 tonnes CO2 eq/GWh4) would represent additional emissions of:  
• 2.6 Gt CO2 (coal), 1.3 Gt CO2 (gas) or 0.8 Gt CO2 (mix) at the world 
level, representing respectively 22%, 11% or 7% of the world’s CO2 
emissions from the power sector; 
                                                     
3. This value corresponds to the mean value of emissions for nuclear which appears 
in Table 2.1, and is higher than the mean value found by Weisser (about 10 tonnes 
CO2-eq/GWh) shown in Figure 2.1. Taking the lower range and upper range 
values appearing in Table 2.1, indirect annual emissions from nuclear power 
would represent between 0.03 and 0.35 Gt CO2. 
4. In 2009, Denmark produced 36.4 TWh from a mix consisting of 18.5% 
renewables, essentially wind, 70.3% fossil – coal and gas, and 11% biofuel and 
waste, and with CO2 emissions representing 303 tonnes CO2 eq./GWh (IEA, 
2011a, 2011b). 
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 • 2.2 Gt CO2 (coal), 1.1 Gt CO2 (gas) or 0.7 Gt CO2 (mix) at the OECD 
level, representing respectively 47%, 23% or 15% of the OECD’s CO2 
emissions from the power sector. 
In conclusion, even taking into account pessimistic evaluations of its 
indirect emissions, nuclear energy is today a major contributor to the reduction 
of CO2 emissions in the power sector. 
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 3. Status of nuclear power and outlook to 2050 
3.1. Current status 
At the end of 2010, there were 441 power reactors in operation in 
30 countries, totalling almost 375 GWe of installed capacity (IAEA/PRIS). 
Overall, nuclear power provides around 13.4% of global electricity, and 21% of 
electricity in OECD countries. In addition, 67 new power reactors were 
officially under construction in 15 countries at the end of 2010.1 Of these, China 
had 27 units under construction, and the Russian Federation had several large 
units under construction. Among OECD countries, the Republic of Korea had 
the largest expansion underway with 5 units, but Finland, France, Japan and the 
Slovak Republic were each building one or two new units. In the United States, 
a long-stalled nuclear project has been reactivated. In total, these new units can 
be expected to add around 60 GWe of new capacity over the next few years.2 
In March 2011, a Level 7 (INES scale) accident occurred at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant following a major earthquake and tsunami. As a 
consequence of this accident, several countries reversed their policy towards 
nuclear energy, choosing either to phase out their existing fleet over the next 
two decades (Belgium, Germany and Switzerland), or abandoning plans to 
reintroduce nuclear energy into the country (Italy). A majority of countries have 
on the other hand, confirmed their plans to continue the development of nuclear 
energy, albeit at a slower pace than initially anticipated. In June 2011, an IAEA 
ministerial conference on nuclear safety adopted a declaration calling for an 
                                                     
1.  Out of those 67 reactors under construction, 11 were started before 1988 and had 
their construction halted or delayed for several reasons. Construction has now 
resumed for all but 3 – so overall 64 reactors could be considered as being actively 
constructed at the time. 
2.  The overall situation changed slightly during 2011 mainly as a result of the 
Fukushima accident: as of 1st March 2012, 436 reactors are in operation 
representing a capacity of over 370 GWe, and 60 reactors are under construction, 
representing a capacity of 57 GWe. In February 2012, the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission approved a Combined Operating License for the 
construction and operation of two new units. These are the first licenses issued in 
the United States since 1978. 
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 improvement in global nuclear safety, and asked the IAEA to prepare a safety 
action plan. This plan was endorsed at the IAEA General Conference in 
September.  
In nearly all countries that have nuclear power, governments ordered 
safety reviews – so-called “stress tests” – to be performed under the authority of 
the nuclear regulators, to assess, inter alia, the resistance of nuclear power 
plants (including those under construction) to major earthquakes and flooding. 
International reviews and sharing of best practices are foreseen before final 
recommendations are issued by the regulators (in 2012). Preliminary 
information published by the regulators themselves indicate that in the majority 
of cases, existing nuclear power plants can operate safely under foreseeable 
seismic loads or flooding. Some safety upgrades (e.g. in the area of emergency 
power generation, flooding prevention, essential core cooling, seismic 
resistance of some equipment) and updates of regulations and procedures may 
still be required in some cases to further enhance the safety of nuclear power 
plants. These recommendations may also limit the extent of the licensing of 
long-term operation for some of the older nuclear power plants.  
For Gen III/III+ plants that are under construction or planned, the cost 
implication of the requirements emanating from the lessons learnt from the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident is believed to be limited, since many of these 
designs already incorporate safety systems against severe accidents (NEA, 
2011). This means that the investment estimates corresponding to future nuclear 
new build published before March 2011 can still be considered realistic. 
However, more extensive siting work and more demanding regulatory approval 
processes will undoubtedly lead to some additional costs and delays, which 
cannot be quantified at this stage. 
Many energy roadmaps published over recent years had foreseen that 
nuclear energy would play a key role alongside renewable technologies and 
CCS in the transition to a low-carbon energy future. Projections and scenarios 
are currently being revised as a consequence of the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
and its impact on energy policies and public acceptance of nuclear energy. The 
current world economic crisis is also having an effect on electricity demand and 
the ability to finance large capital investments in the energy sector, so near- and 
mid-term nuclear energy projections are likely to be affected for those reasons 
too. In the long term for countries willing to pursue the nuclear option, the 
fundamental reasons for having nuclear power in terms of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, competitiveness of electricity production and security of 
supply still apply, and overall capacity is still expected to grow in the coming 
years to match rising electricity demands while moving to low-carbon energy 
sources. 
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 In the next sections, scenarios published before and after the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident will be considered, and building rates to achieve those 
projections will be assessed, taking into account various assumptions on long-
term operations of the existing nuclear reactor fleet. It is recalled that these 
scenarios are by no means predictions, but rather projections of how the energy 
mix of various regions of the world could evolve taking into account economic 
development and demographic growth assumptions, enacted or planned energy 
policies and commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as 
financial, social and technological constraints. 
3.2. Scenarios for nuclear energy expansion to 2050 
To assess the potential contribution of nuclear power to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, it is necessary to consider scenarios for 
overall energy and electricity supply over the next several decades, as well as 
scenarios for the growth of nuclear generating capacity. The present study will 
not attempt to prepare new scenarios, but will consider existing published 
scenarios. Given that the intention is to assess the maximum contribution that 
nuclear could make, the study will concentrate on those scenarios that have the 
highest component of nuclear power in the energy supply mix. 
The principal scenarios considered in this study will be those prepared by 
the IEA. Like the NEA, the IEA is part of the OECD system, and produces 
comprehensive energy scenarios to 2030 (or 2035) and 2050. These regularly 
updated scenarios take into account a wide range of economic and technological 
factors in modelling possible energy futures, including the need to reduce CO2 
emissions from the energy system at the lowest cost. 
The IEA scenarios will also be compared with energy and nuclear power 
scenarios prepared by other organisations, to provide additional perspectives. 
The various scenarios are each described and summarised below. 
World Energy Outlook 
The World Energy Outlook (WEO) is published annually by the IEA, and 
has become one of the most authoritative reports on the future of energy supply. 
In 2011 (IEA, 2011), the WEO presents a reference, or business-as-usual, 
scenario, essentially based on a continuation of existing (i.e. enacted) policies 
and trends (Current Policies Scenario). The New Policies Scenario (NPS) takes 
into account announced commitments and plans. Given the importance now 
placed on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the WEO’s other major scenario 
is the “450 policy” case, that examines the changes in the energy system that 
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 would be needed to bring the concentration of CO2 equivalent in the atmosphere 
to below 450 parts per million by 2050. This is the level considered to be 
necessary to avoid the worst effects of global warming. 
In its 2011 edition, published in November (IEA, 2011), the WEO 
scenarios extend to 2035, by which time nuclear capacity is seen as reaching 
865 GWe in the 450 policy scenario, up from 393 GWe in 2009. In other words, 
it is seen that nuclear capacity could more than double over the next 20 years. In 
the New Policies Scenario, the nuclear capacity is projected to reach 633 GWe. 
In the baseline case (CPS), nuclear capacity would grow more modestly, to 
some 549 GWe, which still represents an increase of nearly 40% compared to 
2009. The additional growth in the 450 ppm scenario can be seen as the direct 
result of efforts to control CO2 emissions. Figure 3.1 shows the breakdown of 
electricity supply sources in the WEO 2011, 450 policy scenario. 
Figure 3.1: Composition of electricity generation capacity by fuel in 2035 for 
different scenarios (CPS, NPS and 450 ppm) 
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 Source: IEA, 2011. 
Energy Technology Perspectives 
The Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) study, updated every two 
years, is the IEA’s main effort to assess the longer-term energy trends, based 
principally on an assessment of the potential of different energy technologies. It 
builds on the WEO scenarios, extending the analysis to 2050. It also has a 
business-as-usual scenario, called the baseline case, as well as a scenario 
illustrating the contribution of different energy technologies in reaching the 
overall target of limiting CO2 equivalent concentration in the atmosphere to 
450 ppm. The latter is known as the “Blue Map” scenario. An important driver 
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 of this scenario is reducing CO2 emissions in the most economically efficient 
manner.  
The ETP 2010 Blue Map scenario (IEA, 2010) projects an installed 
nuclear capacity of almost 1 200 GWe3 in 2050, compared to 370 GWe at the 
end of 2009, making nuclear a major contributor to cutting energy-related CO2 
emissions by 50%. This nuclear capacity would provide 9 600 TWh of 
electricity annually by that date, or around 24% of the electricity produced 
worldwide. By 2050 nuclear power would become the single largest source of 
electricity, surpassing coal, natural gas, hydro, wind and solar. Given that it can 
be expected that most existing capacity will have been retired by that date, even 
with lifetime extension, the great majority of this capacity would need to be 
constructed over the coming 40 years. 
The ETP Blue Map scenario assumes that nuclear capacity can be added at 
an average rate of some 30 GWe per year over the period. A high nuclear 
variant that removes this assumed limit postulates that as much as 2 000 GWe 
of nuclear capacity could be added, according to other economic factors. This 
implies nuclear construction at an average rate of around 50 GWe per year. The 
IEA’s modelling finds that such a large nuclear contribution would reduce the 
overall cost of reducing CO2 emissions, compared with the central Blue Map 
case.  
The Blue Map scenario will be taken as the reference case in the rest of the 
report to evaluate the required nuclear build rates to 2050 under various 
assumptions of long-term operation of the existing nuclear fleet, and to assess 
whether such build rates can be realistically achieved. This scenario has been 
chosen, not because it is more likely than others, but because it projects a large 
development of nuclear power. Potential barriers to this development will be 
examined in the following chapter.  
Other scenarios 
The NEA itself published scenarios for future nuclear generating capacity, 
in its Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008 (NEA, 2008). To 2030, these were based on 
an assessment of the plans and policies of all countries with existing nuclear 
programmes and those considering new nuclear programmes. The NEA 
scenarios were also extended to 2050, with the later two decades based on 
assumptions about the rates of construction of new nuclear plants. The result of 
                                                     
3. The 2012 edition of Energy Technology Perspectives is currently in preparation. 
The projection of 1 200 GWe nuclear capacity by 2050 is likely to be decreased by 
about 10%. 
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 this analysis was a global nuclear capacity of about 620 GWe by 2030, rising to 
over 1 400 GWe by 2050. This assumes that by far the most rapid nuclear 
expansion comes after 2030. 
The World Nuclear Association (WNA) produces nuclear generating 
capacity scenarios to 2030, principally for the purpose of forecasting uranium 
and nuclear fuel demand. These are also based on a “bottom-up” approach, 
considering the policies of individual countries and the prospects for nuclear 
expansion in each case. The WNA’s 2009 upper scenario (WNA, 2009) has 
over 800 GWe by 2030, with 600 GWe in the reference case. In its 2011 edition 
(WNA, 2011), the WNA projected 790 GWe by 2030 for its upper scenario, and 
614 GWe for its reference case. 
The IAEA publishes electricity and nuclear power scenarios annually in a 
publication known as Reference Data Series 1 (RDS1). Until 2009, these 
covered the period to 2030, with a high and a low scenario. From 2010, the 
projections cover the period up to 2050. The latest projections, published in 
August 2011 (IAEA, 2011), consider for the high scenario, 746 GWe in 2030 
and 1 228 GWe in 2050 (representing about 13.5% of world electricity 
generation). For the low scenario, the IAEA considers 501 GWe in 2030 and 
561 GWe in 2050. The 2011 projections to 2050 were reduced by 5% and 13% 
respectively for the low and high scenarios compared to the 2010 projections 
(590 GWe and 1 415 GWe). 
The US Energy Information Administration also publishes projections in 
its International Energy Outlook. In the latest edition (EIA, 2011), published in 
September 2011, the nuclear capacity is projected to reach 644 GWe in 2035, 
above the 633 GWe value of the New Policies Scenario of WEO 2011. 
Projections for the period between 2030 and 2050, published after the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident are generally down by 5 to 10% compared to the 
projections published before 2011. The various scenarios still project a 
significant nuclear capacity increase over the next decades, with the highest 
projections corresponding to policies aimed at a transition to low-carbon 
generation mix.  
Overall, there is good agreement between the scenarios that about 
800 GWe of nuclear capacity could be in place by 2035, if ambitious policies 
designed to control greenhouse gas emissions are put in place within the next 
few years in many large energy consuming nations (if there is no commitment 
to implement such policies, many projections foresee a nuclear capacity of 
about 600 GWe by 2035). Fewer scenarios consider the outlook to 2050, and 
inevitably the outlook a further 20 years into the future is more uncertain. 
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 However, the ETP scenarios indicate that there is a role for nuclear capacity in 
the range of 1 200 to 2 000 GWe by that date, provided that sufficient industrial 
capacity can be developed to construct and fuel such a capacity.  
3.3. Required rates of construction of nuclear power plants 
If nuclear energy is to make a significant contribution to the transition to a 
low-carbon energy system, as set out in the scenarios discussed above, clearly 
the rate of construction of nuclear power plants will need to increase 
considerably from present levels. As noted above, 64 nuclear plants with a total 
capacity of 64 GWe were actively under construction at the end of 2010. In 
2010 alone, 16 new construction starts were announced. On the assumption that 
construction of a new nuclear plant takes approximately 5 years, this is 
equivalent to an annual rate of construction of about 13 GWe. 
The rate of construction required to reach the nuclear capacity included in 
the various energy scenarios will depend partly on the remaining lifetimes of the 
existing reactor fleet, most of which will retire at some point before 2050. Most 
existing reactors began operating in the 1970s and 1980s, with relatively few 
having entered operation after 1990. It can be expected, therefore, that most of 
these plants will also close down over a period of about 20 years. The 
technically feasible operating lifetime of most types of existing reactor is now 
thought to be up to 60 years. In the United States where 104 reactors are in 
operation, the nuclear regulator had, as of July 2011, granted licence renewals 
to 70 reactors allowing them to operate for 60 years, with 14 further 
applications under review. In Europe, where the issue of long-term operation 
(LTO) is also very important given the age of the fleet (about a quarter of the 
reactors are more than 30 years old), different regulatory frameworks are in 
place to address long-term operation licensing. For example regulators generally 
give a position on continuation of operation through the process of periodic 
safety reviews, which are performed every ten years. Such a process should 
realistically allow most reactors to operate between 40 and 60 years. 
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 Figure 3.2: Evolution of capacity (GWe) of existing reactors  
for different long-term operation assumptions by regions 
(a) OECD Europe 
 
(b) OECD America 
(c) OECD Pacific 
 
(d) Rest of the world 
Of course, not all reactors will be licensed for long-term operation. In 
some cases, the upgrades and refurbishments required to replace ageing 
equipment and enable the plants to continue to meet regulatory requirements 
may be uneconomic, given the remaining time for which the considered plant 
will be operated before final shutdown. In addition to the refurbishments related 
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 to the need to replace ageing equipment, there may also be safety upgrade work 
required as a consequence of the Fukushima Daiichi stress tests, which will add 
to the cost of the investment for the plant operator. Reactors may also be shut 
down due to changes in government energy policy. However, it can be expected 
that the majority of reactors in operation today will operate for 50 to 60 years. 
Figure 3.2 shows the capacity provided by the existing reactor fleet in OECD 
Europe (taking into account planned phase-outs in Belgium, Germany, and 
Switzerland as well as planned shutdowns for the United Kingdom’s AGR and 
MAGNOX reactors), OECD Pacific (assuming for Japan the permanent 
shutdown of Fukushima Daiichi units 1-4), OECD America (assuming 60-year 
lifetime for all PWRs and BWRs in the region and taking into account planned 
shutdowns for Canada’s CANDU reactors) and the rest of the world for 
different lifetime assumptions (typically 40 to 60 years).  
Figure 3.3: Evolution of capacity provided by existing reactors (2011) assuming 
a 55-year operating life for all regions except 60 years for OECD America 
(PWR and BWR) 
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Figure 3.3 shows the overall capacity for the world nuclear reactors 
assuming 60-year operation for reactors in the United States, and 55 years for 
the rest of the world. This figure shows that by 2050, only about 50 GWe 
capacity remains from today’s operating reactors (9 GWe in OECD Europe, 
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 5 GWe in OECD America, 17 GWe in OECD Pacific, and 19 GWe in the rest 
of the world). This does not include reactors under construction. 
The target of 1 200 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2050 projected by the 
IEA’s ETP 2010 Blue Map scenario is therefore essentially reached through 
new build. The extent of long-term operation of existing power plants does not 
really change the amount of new capacity that needs to be built by 2050, it only 
delays the time when the construction rate needs to increase substantially. 
Figure 3.4 shows the nuclear capacity growth projected in the Blue Map 
scenario (IEA, 2010), i.e. rising to 512 GWe by 2020, 685 GWe by 2030, 
900 GWe by 2040, and 1 200 GWe by 2050. The figure also shows the new 
build rates that are needed to reach that capacity, taking into account the 
assumed evolution of the capacity existing in November 2011. 
Figure 3.4: New build rates needed to reach Blue Map projections, assuming  
60 years of operation for existing reactors in the United States and  
55 years elsewhere 
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Note that the evolution of the existing capacity and the construction rates refer to the scale on the 
left vertical axis, whereas the projected capacity evolution of the Blue Map scenario refers to the 
scale on the right. 
To meet the level of nuclear generating capacity mentioned above for 
2020, new nuclear power plants will need to be built at the rate of close to 
16 GWe per year over the current decade. This is only slightly greater than the 
presently achieved rate of about 13 GWe. Given that there is clearly some 
under-utilised capacity for nuclear construction (for example, in the United 
States and several European countries), it would appear that achieving an 
installed nuclear capacity of around 512 GWe by 2020 is certainly feasible with 
a gradual build-up of industrial capabilities and human resources. 
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 However, the longer-term picture is more challenging. If nuclear capacity 
is to reach around 685 GWe by 2030, the rate of construction will need to grow 
to around 20 GWe per year on average between 2020 and 2030. 
Figure 3.5: World nuclear construction rates between 1978 and 1987  
and required construction rates up to 2050 
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  Source: IAEA PRIS. 
As a significant number of older plants can be expected to be retired in the 
2030s, an increasing proportion of new build will be taken up with replacing 
existing capacity. Hence, reaching a capacity of 900 GWe by 2040 will require 
the rate of nuclear construction to rise to an average of 35 GWe per year 
between 2030 and 2040. To reach a capacity close to 1 200 GWe by 2050 will 
require that the average construction rate rises to 42 GWe per year between 
2040 and 2050, as the remaining reactors that started up in the 1980s retire. 
These construction rates are challenging, but as shown in Figure 3.5, they 
should be attainable given the fact that annual grid connections of up to 
30 GWe/year were reached between 1978 and 1987, at a time when nuclear 
construction was limited to a few countries which did not include China. With 
over 26 GWe of new nuclear capacity currently under construction, China 
boasts today one of the largest supply chains for nuclear construction. However, 
it must also be recognised that most of this new build corresponds to 
Gen II-type reactors similar to those constructed in OECD countries in the 
1970s and 1980s. Newer designs, such as those of Gen III/III+ reactors which 
will be the main type of reactors deployed in the world in the coming decades 
are more complex, and may require longer construction times.  
To assess the impact of LTO assumptions on new build rates, two cases 
are considered: In the first one, all nuclear reactors in the world are assumed to 
have a 40-year lifetime except in the United States where the 60-year lifetime 
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 assumption can be considered valid. In that case, less than 7 GWe from today’s 
existing capacity will remain by 2050, and almost all of the 1 200 GWe of the 
Blue Map projection will consist of reactors built between 2011 and 2050. To 
achieve the target, the average building rates need to reach almost 20 GWe/year 
between 2011 and 2020, about 30 GWe/year between 2020 and 2040, and up to 
38 GWe/year between 2040 and 2050. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6: New build rates needed to reach Blue Map projections, assuming 
60 years of operation for existing reactors in the United States and  
40 years elsewhere 
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In the second case, 60-year operation is assumed for all reactors. This 
means that by 2050, about 75 GWe of capacity that existed in 2011 still 
remains. As can be seen from Figure 3.7, the construction rate only gradually 
increases until 2030, from today’s 13 GWe/year rate: about 16 GWe/year would 
be needed on average between now and 2020, about 20 GWe/year from 2020 to 
2030. In the last two decades, a steep rise in construction rate is needed, with 
30 GWe/year needed between 2030 and 2040, and over 46 GWe/year between 
2040 and 2050. This level should still be within reach given past building rates 
in the 1980s. 
As can be seen from these simulations, the maximum construction rate that 
is needed to reach the 1 200 GWe target of the Blue Map scenario is influenced 
by the assumptions on long-term operations of existing reactors. The longer 
today’s reactors operate, the higher are the building rates in the last decades to 
catch up with the required new build capacity, since in all cases, most of today’s 
reactors will be shut down by 2050. 
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Figure 3.7: New build rates needed to reach Blue Map projections, assuming 
60 years of operation for all existing reactors 
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Table 3.1: LTO assumptions and required new capacity additions  
to reach 1 200 GWe by 2050 
Long‐term 
operation 
assumptions 
Remaining 
capacity by 
2050 (GWe) 
New build capacity required to reach Blue Map target 
(GWe) 
2011‐2020  2020‐2030  2030‐2040  2040‐2050 
40 years for all 
reactors (except 
60 years in the US) 
7  197  309  301  379 
55 years for all 
reactors (except 
60 years in the US) 
51  161  205  354  423 
60 years for all 
reactors 
75  161  196  298  464 
Table 3.1 summarises the results of the three LTO scenarios in terms of 
remaining capacity by 2050, and the amount of new capacity that would need to 
be added to reach 1 200 GWe installed capacity by 2050. (Note that the results 
differ slightly from the published IEA/NEA Nuclear Energy Roadmap 
corresponding to the Blue Map scenario of ETP 2010, since the evolution of the 
capacity takes into account the Fukushima Daiichi accident.) 
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 4. Economic, technical, societal, institutional and 
legal factors affecting nuclear expansion 
In this chapter, the issues that are key to the projected nuclear capacity 
expansions described previously are analysed. These include financing and 
investment needs, supply chain and skilled labour aspects, uranium resources 
issues, siting, waste management, standardisation of designs and public 
acceptance of nuclear energy. 
4.1. Financing and investment 
The investments needed to make large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions 
from the energy over the next four decades sector will be very large whichever 
technologies are employed. All options will involve the construction of more 
capital intensive generating capacity than the traditional coal- and gas-fired 
plants. 
Table 4.1: Investment needs for nuclear to 2050  
Region  Investment needs to 2050
OECD Europe  586 USD bn
OECD Pacific  615 USD bn
United States and Canada 883 USD bn
China  893 USD bn
India  389 USD bn
Others  609 USD bn
Total  3 975 USD bn
 
Source: IEA, 2010, Blue Map scenario, 1 200 GWe installed capacity by 2050. 
In accordance with the assumptions made, the IEA model used to prepare 
the Blue Map scenario (IEA, 2010) indicates that increasing the proportion of 
nuclear power can reduce the overall cost of cutting CO2 emissions. However, it 
is clear that constructing well over 1 000 GWe of new nuclear capacity by 2050 
will require a very large investment. The IEA estimate of the investment 
required in nuclear capacity over the period to 2050 is shown in Table 4.1, and 
amounts to about USD 4 trillion (this only covers the investments needed to 
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 construct new reactors, and does not include the cost of dismantling of retired 
plants, waste management or fuel cycle facilities). 
While the overall investment in nuclear capacity required to provide the 
expansion foreseen in the scenario may be comparable with that required for 
other energy and emissions reduction technologies, nuclear power plant 
construction projects have a number of specific characteristics and 
circumstances that can make nuclear financing particularly challenging. These 
include: 
• The high capital cost and technical complexity of NPPs, which present 
relatively high risks during both construction and operation. 
• The relatively long period required to recoup investments or repay 
loans for NPP construction, which increases the risk from electricity 
market uncertainties. 
• The often controversial nature of nuclear projects, which gives rise to 
additional political and regulatory risks. 
• The need for clear solutions and financing schemes for radioactive 
waste management and decommissioning. 
• The need for NPPs to operate at high capacity factors, preferably 
under baseload conditions. 
• The high share of fixed costs which makes nuclear energy particularly 
vulnerable to price risk in sometimes volatile deregulated electricity 
markets. 
Although some risks can be transferred to or shared with other parties by 
appropriate structuring of the project, most of them will remain with the utility 
and other investors in the plant. 
The higher capital costs of an NPP mean that its overall economics are 
more dependent on the cost of capital, or discount rate, which applies to the 
investment in its construction. With any investment, higher risks demand higher 
returns. Thus, the cost of capital will depend on potential investors’ assessment 
of the risks involved. This will vary depending on who the investors are, the 
legal and regulatory framework in which the plant would be built, as well as 
national energy policy and the political background. 
During the previous major expansion of nuclear power in the 1970s and 
1980s, many nuclear projects suffered large construction delays and cost 
overruns. These had several different causes, ranging from licensing and legal 
problems to technical difficulties. Given also the lack of recent experience with 
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 new NPP construction in most countries, the legacy of such problems increases 
the risks perceived by potential investors. Of course, such risks will be reduced 
when there is a successful track record of building a particular design on 
schedule and within projected costs. 
Strong and consistent government support is an essential prerequisite for 
initiating or expanding any nuclear programme. Given the long time frame 
involved, a broad-based political consensus is likely to be needed on a nuclear 
contribution to energy supply as part of a comprehensive long-term national 
energy strategy. First and foremost, governments need to put in place an 
efficient regulatory framework, allowing clear and definite decision-making 
within a reasonable timescale. Stable, legal frameworks dealing with liability 
issues, radioactive waste management and decommissioning are crucial. In 
addition, governments have a key role in providing public information and 
leading national debate on the role of nuclear power, to establish the necessary 
political consensus. 
In addition, governments that wish to see a nuclear contribution to energy 
supply may need to take a number of steps to enable and facilitate the necessary 
investment in NPPs. For example, an important factor affecting the 
competitiveness of nuclear power will be the cost of carbon dioxide emissions 
under existing and planned carbon trading schemes. The role of governments 
will be considered further later in this report. 
In the short to medium term, large, financially strong utilities will be best 
able to finance new NPPs, especially if they are vertically integrated (i.e. they 
have direct access to electricity consumers). Such utilities presently exist in 
countries such as France, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In countries where 
the market is more fragmented, such as the United States, higher levels of direct 
government support may be required to share in the construction risks. 
There is little likelihood at the present stage that a stand-alone project 
company could finance a new NPP by raising the capital it needs using only the 
NPP project itself as collateral. Even for hybrid schemes including a significant 
proportion of equity, debt investors are unlikely to be willing to provide 
significant funding for a nuclear plant without recourse against the balance 
sheet of a strong and creditworthy utility. 
In the longer term, once the successful construction and operation of new 
nuclear plants has become well established in a particular country, it can be 
expected that financing by the private sector will become easier to arrange. 
However, financing is currently one of the major issues facing potential 
developers of new nuclear plants in many countries. 
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 4.2. Industrial infrastructure 
Significantly increasing the rate of nuclear construction by 2020 to reach 
the levels of deployment envisaged in the Blue Map and other scenarios for 
rapid nuclear expansion will require large investments over the next few years 
in additional industrial capacities. 
Nuclear plant construction reached considerably higher levels than at 
present during the 1970s. During that decade, construction starts peaked at over 
40 units per year, with an average of over 30 per year (see Figure 4.1). This was 
a large increase over the preceding decade. Although these units were smaller 
than current designs, the technology was also less well developed at that time. 
In addition, relatively few countries were involved in that earlier rapid nuclear 
expansion, and overall global industrial capacity has increased greatly since the 
1970s. A large share of the future expansion of electricity supply, and hence of 
nuclear new build, will take place in large, rapidly industrialising non-OECD 
countries (notably China and India). Today, China already boasts a well-
established supply chain for its ambitious nuclear programme. 
Figure 4.1: Number of construction starts during the 1970s 
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Source: IAEA PRIS. 
However, there are many other factors at work, many of which are 
different from 30 to 40 years ago. Investment in increased capacities, if it is to 
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 be made on a commercial basis, will only take place once it is clear that 
sufficient long-term demand exists. Capacities can thus be expected to build up 
gradually over a period of some years in response to rising demand. A rising 
level of orders for new nuclear plants over the next few years will be needed not 
only to achieve an increased nuclear capacity by 2020, but also to allow for the 
expansion of industrial capacities that will be required for more rapid growth 
after 2020. 
Nuclear power plants are highly complex construction projects. The 
nuclear supplier, as the designer and technology holder, will supply only the 
plant’s nuclear systems. A wide range of specialist sub-contractors and 
suppliers is involved in providing and installing the remaining systems and 
components, including the turbo-generator set and associated equipment that 
make up the conventional island, and which are specific to nuclear power 
plants. The “architect-engineering” function, encompassing general 
engineering, scheduling and cost management, and co-ordination between 
contractors and suppliers, is also very important in a nuclear project. 
Hence, complex global supply chains would need to be developed and 
managed to ensure the successful completion of nuclear projects. As more 
orders are placed for new nuclear plants, supply chains would become broader 
as suppliers seek to expand their capacity to serve markets around the world. 
This could mean involving local and regional construction and engineering 
firms as nuclear energy expands into new markets. 
The production of most reactor components can be increased within, at 
most, a few years in response to market demand. The longest lead time for 
capacity additions is expected to be for large steel forgings, which are used in 
greater numbers in the latest nuclear plant designs. While there is adequate 
capacity to produce many of these forgings, the largest forgings for some 
designs can presently be produced in a very limited number of facilities 
throughout the world. It can take five years or more to expand such heavy 
forgings capacity, as it requires a very large investment and only a few 
companies have the necessary expertise. Plans to expand very large forgings 
capacity are now being developed, although going ahead with these is likely to 
depend on receiving firm customer commitments. 
4.3. Skilled labour and knowledge management 
The nuclear energy sector, which includes the nuclear industry itself, plus 
utilities, regulators and other governmental agencies, requires highly qualified 
and skilled human resources. Expanding nuclear energy will require a larger 
pool of highly trained scientists and engineers, and skilled crafts-people, all of 
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 which are potentially in short supply. Many nuclear industry companies have in 
recent years expanded their recruitment and training programmes, and there is 
also a role for governments and universities in ensuring the availability of 
appropriate courses and training. 
The long lifetimes of nuclear power plants, extending over several human 
generations, make knowledge management an important consideration. 
Preservation of knowledge is important for achieving safe and effective lifetime 
extension of existing units, as well as for designing and building new plants that 
benefit from experience. Important know-how may be lost as the scientists and 
engineers who implemented the ambitious nuclear programmes of the 1970s 
and 1980s reach retirement age. Hence, knowledge management and 
transmission of know-how to younger specialists will need to be high priorities 
in the nuclear sector. 
4.4. Uranium and the nuclear fuel cycle 
If nuclear energy is to expand significantly over the coming decades, 
supplies of nuclear fuel will need to expand commensurately. This will include 
increased production of uranium, greater capacity in nuclear fuel cycle facilities 
and, in the longer term, the increased use of recycling and advanced fuel cycles. 
Table 4.2: Approximate ratios of uranium resources to present annual 
consumption for different categories of resources 
 
Known 
conventional 
resources 
Total 
conventional 
resources 
With 
unconventional 
resources 
With present reactors and 
fuel cycles 100 300 700 
With fast reactors and 
advanced fuel cycles > 3 000 > 9 000 > 21 000 
Source: NEA, 2008a. 
Despite limited exploration over the last 20 years, the ratio of known 
uranium resources to present consumption is comparable to other mineral 
energy resources, representing about 100 years’ supply. Additional resources 
that are expected (on the basis of existing geological information) to be 
discovered could increase this to around 300 years’ supply. Inclusion of 
estimated “unconventional” resources, notably uranium contained in phosphate 
rocks, could extend resources to about 700 years (Table 4.2). The estimated 
4 billion tonnes of uranium contained in seawater would constitute a virtually 
inexhaustible supply, if a method to extract it economically were to be 
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 developed. A recent evaluation of the cost of uranium recovered from seawater 
was reported in 2011 (Schneider, 2011) and calculated a baseline cost of 
uranium of USD 1 230/kgU. While this cost is about nine times the current 
market price of uranium, the overall impact on the cost of electricity is 
about 20%.   
If nuclear capacity reaches around 1 200 GWe by 2050, on the basis of 
current fuel cycle technology and practice this would consume about 5.6 million 
tonnes of uranium between 2010 and 2050. However, several technological 
developments could increase the amount of energy produced from each tonne of 
uranium over the coming decades, thereby reducing total uranium consumption. 
These include improved operating and fuel management practices, advances in 
fuel design and materials, and higher thermal efficiencies in new and upgraded 
nuclear plants. 
In addition, deployment of new enrichment technologies will have an 
impact. As there is a trade-off between the amounts of natural uranium and 
enrichment work required to produce a given quantity of enriched uranium, the 
proportion of the 235U extracted from natural uranium depends largely on the 
relative costs of enrichment and natural uranium. The wider use of centrifuge 
enrichment technology, which has lower operating costs than older diffusion 
technology, is expected to lead to increased efficiency of uranium use. 
As well as new centrifuge plants, more efficient advanced centrifuges will 
gradually replace older models within existing centrifuge plants. In addition, 
new enrichment technology using lasers is now being tested and plans are being 
considered to have the first commercial laser enrichment plant in operation by 
around 2015. Such developments could potentially allow more 235U to be 
extracted from existing stocks of depleted uranium, as well as permitting the 
more efficient use of newly mined uranium in the future. 
Nevertheless, in such a scenario, demand for newly mined uranium would 
still represent a large part of currently known conventional uranium resources of 
about 6.3 million tonnes (NEA, 2010). However, as noted above, additional and 
unconventional resources could greatly extend the amount of uranium available. 
In response to higher uranium prices, annual uranium exploration expenditures 
have risen three-fold since 2002, from a low base. Figure 4.2 shows for example 
the correlation between uranium spot prices and exploration expenditures 
between 1970 and 2009. As nuclear power expansion gets underway, a further 
sustained increase in uranium exploration activity can be expected as in the 
past, with many regions having the potential for further major discoveries to 
replace exploited resources. As for unconventional resources, including 
phosphate deposits that could be utilised to significantly lengthen the time that 
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 nuclear power could supply energy demand using current technologies, 
considerable effort and investment would need to be devoted to better defining 
the extent of this potentially significant source of uranium. 
Figure 4.2: Correlation between uranium spot price and 
exploration expenditures between 1970 and 2009 
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If uranium resources themselves are unlikely to be a limiting factor for the 
expansion of nuclear programmes, the timely availability on the market of 
adequate uranium supplies could be a cause for concern. Developing new 
mines, both to replace exhausted existing mines and expand overall production 
capacity, will require large investments over the coming decades. Licensing and 
developing new mines, often in remote areas, can take many years. The lesson 
of the recent past is that, even with the stimulus of higher uranium prices, 
production can take some years to respond. 
Existing uranium mining companies and new entrants will be ready to 
invest in new capacity given the right price signals, and sufficient policy and 
regulatory certainty. Developers of nuclear power plants may seek to secure at 
least some of their uranium supply in advance of construction, through long-
term contracts or even through direct investment in new production capacity. 
Governments of countries with commercially viable uranium resources have a 
role to play in ensuring a supportive policy environment and effective 
regulatory procedures. 
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 Several different technologies exist for uranium extraction, and advances 
in mining technology could improve the viability of some uranium resources. 
Conventional underground and open-pit mining presently account for about 
60% of production. In situ leach (ISL) techniques have been more widely 
deployed in the last decade, now providing almost 30% of production. The 
advantages of ISL include lower up-front capital costs, the ability to exploit 
smaller deposits and lower environmental impacts. Uranium production as a by-
product (usually of gold or copper) is also significant, and could be extended in 
future. 
In the longer term, the commercial deployment of advanced reactors and 
fuel cycles that recycle nuclear fuel could permit much greater amounts of 
energy to be obtained from each tonne of uranium (Table 4.2). The development 
of such advanced nuclear systems will be further discussed later in Chapter 6. 
Given the expected availability of uranium resources, a large increase in nuclear 
capacity by 2050 can be achieved without their large-scale deployment. 
However, if lower cost uranium resources become scarcer, the economic 
attractiveness of recycling nuclear fuel will increase. 
Existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities for UF6 conversion, enrichment and 
fuel fabrication are adequate for levels of demand expected in the next few 
years, and there are near-term plans for replacing and expanding capacities as 
required. In addition, countries where significant nuclear power programmes are 
underway, such as China and India, are planning to increase their domestic 
nuclear fuel capabilities. In general, nuclear fuel cycle capacities can be 
expanded in less time than it takes to build new nuclear generating capacity. 
Hence, security of supply for nuclear fuel cycle services should not, in 
principle, be a significant concern. 
However, if nuclear capacity expands significantly after 2020 there will be 
a need for new large-scale facilities in additional countries. Building new 
conversion and fuel fabrication facilities as required should not cause 
difficulties. But the technology involved in enrichment is sensitive from a non-
proliferation perspective, which will limit the potential locations for new 
facilities. For some countries concerned about security of energy supply, this 
may be a disincentive to rely on nuclear energy. 
One solution could be to establish “black box” enrichment plants, where 
the host country would not have access to the technology. Discussions are also 
underway in international forums on creating mechanisms to provide assurances 
of nuclear fuel supply to countries that do not have their own enrichment 
facilities. Progress with such proposals could facilitate nuclear expansion in a 
broader range of countries after 2020. In the longer term, the development of 
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 proliferation-resistant advanced nuclear systems may offer technological 
solutions to this issue. 
4.5. Siting considerations 
The selection of suitable sites for new nuclear power plants is subject to a 
number of criteria, established to ensure the safety and security of the plants and 
hence the protection of the population. Requirements for siting in each country 
will depend on local legislation and regulations. There are also guidelines 
developed at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
for instance the Safety Requirements and the Safety Standards publications 
(IAEA, 2003, 2010a). In addition, the siting of any electricity generation plant 
has to take into account the location of major demand centres and the existence 
of suitable transmission lines or the ability to construct these. 
This suggests that the number of suitable sites for nuclear plants may not 
be unlimited. Although there may be a large number of suitable sites globally, 
their availability in any particular country or region could be restricted. If 
nuclear power were to expand rapidly over the next few decades, a question 
could arise over the availability of sufficient sites in suitable locations. 
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan in 
March 2011 has highlighted the particular requirements for siting nuclear plants 
in zones of high seismicity and in zones prone to flooding, whether caused by 
earthquake-related tsunamis, or from dike breaks or other causes. Where plants 
are to be sited in such zones, clearly special precautions need to be taken and 
the design features of the plant and its associated equipment modified 
accordingly. The accident has also highlighted the risk of “common mode 
failure” when a single event affects several reactors built on the same site. 
Multiple nuclear units are often situated on the same site, or on closely 
adjacent sites. In addition, many existing sites have space available for further 
units to be co-located. Many countries with existing nuclear plants are thus 
planning to build new reactors on existing sites (including sites where the 
existing reactors have already closed or will do so in the near future). Of course, 
if the option to build on existing sites is limited, then selection of new sites will 
be required. 
The siting process generally consists of an investigation of a large region 
to select one or more candidate sites, followed by a detailed evaluation of each 
of those sites before making a final decision. Factors considered in site selection 
include the availability of cooling water, distance to populated areas, seismic 
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 and flooding risks. Analyses for the site selection process take considerable time 
and resources, which is also a limitation for providing a precise estimate on how 
many sites may be available. Once selected, the suitability of the site is 
considered as part of the licensing process for the plant. The suitability of the 
site is reassessed periodically when a new licence has to be issued, for instance 
when long-term operation is requested. Over a period of 40 years for instance, 
changes in the natural environment or the climate can occur so that the 
suitability of the site has to be reassessed. Industrial and urban development 
also needs to be taken into account. 
4.6. Radioactive waste management 
Management of radioactive waste arising from nuclear power production 
has long been considered an important issue due to the political, economic and 
societal implications associated with it. The development and implementation 
of a strategy to manage long-lived high-level waste (HLW) associated with 
spent fuel is seen in particular as a condition to enable the further development 
of nuclear energy. There is an international consensus that technical solutions 
exist (NEA, 2008b), and some countries are leading the way in implementing 
those solutions. 
Like any industrial activity, nuclear electricity generation produces waste, 
but some of this waste is radioactive and requires appropriate management 
processes. The radioactive waste can be classified within two main categories: 
short-lived waste, the radioactivity of which will decrease by a factor of 2 every 
30 years; and long-lived waste, the radioactivity of which will decrease but over 
a much longer duration. 
All radioactive waste resulting from nuclear electricity generation are 
managed according to four principles: 
• limiting the quantity of waste; 
• conditioning and preparing long-term waste management; 
• sorting according to the nature of waste and the radioactivity level; 
• isolating from man and the environment. 
Short-lived waste  
The operation of the nuclear facilities produces short-lived waste. Those 
waste, of low and medium activity, represent more than 90% of the total 
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 quantity, but they contain only 0.1% of the radioactivity of the waste. Their 
radioactivity decreases very rapidly and proven industrial solutions exist for 
their disposal. 
Long-lived waste 
After having produced its energy during four to five years, the nuclear fuel 
is used. Current progress has increased the energy efficiency of fuel assemblies 
and reduced the quantity of used fuel for the same energy output.  
The used fuel content (fuel material) is formed by: about 96% of valuable 
material – uranium (95%) and plutonium (1%) – which can be recycled; and 
about 4% of high-level long-lived waste, mainly constituted of fission products 
(caesium, cadmium, tin, molybdenum, etc.) and for a smaller part (0.1%) of 
minor actinides produced through neutron capture by heavy nuclei 
(e.g. americium). 
The metallic structure of the fuel assembly (metallic tubing containing the 
fuel material), which is activated in reactor due to neutron flux, is by itself an 
intermediate-level long-lived waste (ILW). 
Whatever the long-term policy chosen for spent fuel management 
(i.e. direct disposal or reprocessing), the spent fuel management begins with a 
storage period of several years for cooling, first under water in the spent fuel 
pool for some years at the reactor site, and then either in another wet storage 
facility (or in the same pool), or in a dry storage facility in metallic casks or 
concrete vaults, waiting for the final management choice. 
Depending on the long-term policy, the used fuel can be either: 
• Conditioned in specific casks or packages to be placed in a geological 
disposal after years or even decades of cooling. The used fuel, 
including the fissile material still present, is then considered as a 
whole as a waste. This option – direct disposal of spent fuel, also 
called “once-through fuel cycle” – has not yet been implemented in 
any country, but Finland, which has chosen this option, will be the 
first country to implement geological disposal of spent fuel by 2020, 
closely followed by Sweden.  
• Or, after five to eight years, the used fuel is reprocessed in order to 
separate the high-level waste and to condition them in a specific and 
suitable way by vitrification, and to recycle the valuable nuclear 
material uranium and plutonium to manufacture new fuel, while 
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 maintaining open the long-term energy resources options. This 
reprocessing recycling strategy is currently working at an industrial 
and proven scale. Just as for direct disposal of spent fuel, deep 
geological disposal of the final waste produced after reprocessing is 
the chosen option. It has not yet been implemented in any country, 
though France is set to start construction of its geological disposal site 
around 2015, and first disposal around 2025. 
• For countries which have not yet chosen between direct spent fuel 
disposal or reprocessing, centralised interim storage of spent fuel is 
another option which gives time to develop a spent fuel strategy. This 
can be interpreted as a way to postpone a decision on how to deal with 
the nuclear spent fuel, and is sometimes called the “wait and see” 
option. 
To ensure successful implementation of high-level waste management 
policies, stakeholder involvement is necessary in the decision-making process. 
To gain confidence and trust it is important that the stakeholders’ concerns are 
heard and addressed correctly. Key stakeholders are the government, the 
regulators, the local communities, the waste producers, the scientific 
communities and the general public (NEA, 2008c). 
4.7. Standardisation of reactor designs 
In spite of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear power is still 
considered by many countries as a major energy source for the future – 
providing benefits for national energy independence as well as global 
environmental preservation. For potential investors, however, global expansion 
of nuclear power continues to be viewed primarily through a financial and 
economic prism that focuses particularly on nuclear power’s competitiveness 
compared to other sources of baseload power such as coal and gas. 
A major opportunity in this equation is the potential for economies of scale 
which can be achieved by building plants in series. The French nuclear 
programme which saw the construction of 58 reactors from the middle of the 
1970s to the end of the 1980s using a limited series of standardised PWRs is 
seen as an example in that respect. To achieve progress in this direction at a 
more global level, it is important that national safety regulations be mutually 
validated and harmonised. The achievement of harmonisation of nuclear safety 
standards could overcome this obstacle, facilitating the emergence of a global 
market that offers a choice of a small number of advanced reactor types that are 
recognised by regulators as safe and technologically mature. This important step 
could kick-start serial reactor construction worldwide. 
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 This approach can bring shared benefits, for the industry through increase 
in efficiency, but also for safety enhancement through intensified experience 
feedback sharing for similar plants, and also for regulators and customers.  
Benefits of standardisation for the nuclear industry 
Standardised designs and harmonisation of industrial engineering codes 
and standards will reduce the overall engineering and construction time and 
cost, reduce licensing risk and increase predictability of construction, improving 
the financial feasibility of nuclear new build. 
Seen from a vendor perspective, the gain lies in the ability to sell a reactor 
to any customer (electricity company) in any country without the need for 
design changes, unless justified by site-specific circumstances. Seen from an 
electricity company (owner-operator) perspective, standardisation does offer a 
“fleet” operational concept, whether an electric utility operates in only one 
country or operates only one plant of a particular design in one country as part 
of a larger international “fleet” of that design. 
This approach should also be of benefit to the supply chain of high-quality 
nuclear components. Just as in construction, the supply of standard components 
should be at lower costs and higher quality than supply of custom-made 
components. This greater volume of standard supply will also encourage more 
suppliers to invest in quality and enter the supply chain, thus enhancing 
competition while ensuring availability of components meets the needs of the 
nuclear new build programmes. 
Harmonisation of national nuclear safety standards will enhance the 
stability of regulatory regimes, thus providing a major prerequisite for 
investment decisions. Close collaboration among regulators may also lead to a 
convergence of licensing procedures as well as safety standards. Currently, 
there are still major differences in licensing. 
Finally, harmonisation of safety standards will enhance public confidence 
not only in regulators (as mentioned earlier) but also in operators, and can thus 
have a positive impact on public and political acceptance of new nuclear power 
plant construction. 
Benefits of standardisation for nuclear safety 
The nuclear industry, with safety as its core principle and responsibility, 
envisages that standardisation of designs will lead to higher levels of safety. 
These benefits derive from being able to draw on design and operational 
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 experience in all phases of a plant’s life cycle: construction, commissioning and 
long-term operation, with actual fleet experience and reliability databases 
providing the underpinning for enhanced safety. In the design phase, new plant 
designs incorporate the latest technology and lessons learnt from the current 
operating fleet. 
During construction, each subsequent plant of the same design will benefit 
from the experience accumulated in the construction of previous plants. This 
will also yield benefits in terms of the quality of construction through repeated 
application of the same proven construction methods and techniques. 
In the operational phase, a global fleet of standardised nuclear plants offers 
the potential for increased operational excellence, better availability and 
capacity factors, and improved maintenance efficiency. 
Feedback from operational experience will apply directly to all plants of 
the fleet, thus offering the possibility to strengthen safety in a continuous and 
uniform fashion. Operation of a fleet of standard plants allows operational 
support to move easily between plants and provides a clear focus for technical, 
maintenance and procurement support. 
Clearly, if a company fleet is part of a wider national or international 
family of plants, even greater benefits can be derived from shared experience, 
internal benchmarking and best practice assessment. This possibility points to 
an enhanced role for “owners groups” uniting the vendor of a specific design 
and the operators running this design. 
With the deployment of a large number of reactors of one design, a defect 
can be revealed and potentially affect the whole fleet; in any case, the 
probability of early detection of any design flaw is much higher due to rapid 
accumulation of experience and knowledge exchange during evaluation, testing 
and operation, which can enable the implementation of preventive measures at a 
precocious stage. 
Further, in the unlikely event of a significant generic shortcoming, 
remedying and backfitting measures could be organised and implemented in a 
very efficient manner across all plants. Operators, vendors and regulators 
involved could easily co-operate on the basis of internationally harmonised 
regulations, voluntary initiatives and reporting requirements. 
In this model, backfitting measures are taken quickly and uniformly, 
offering maximum benefit for safety internationally. Such an approach offers 
potential benefit both for nuclear regulators and the nuclear industry. 
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 Benefits of standardisation for regulators 
A greater convergence and harmonisation of national standards would 
allow for increased international co-operation among regulators. Regulatory 
design reviews, which are central to the national licensing processes, would be 
improved, in both effectiveness and efficiency, by sharing methods and data 
arising from safety evaluations. 
Moreover, knowledge transfer on all regulatory issues, including 
regulatory practice, could greatly facilitate the development of civil nuclear 
energy in emerging nuclear countries, which have yet to develop well-
established and independent regulatory regimes. Such collaboration will be 
facilitated if a high degree of convergence of rules and standards is achieved 
internationally and the process of harmonisation may lead to a common choice 
of the most reasonable and convincing solutions.  
Finally, the harmonisation of safety standards can have a positive impact 
on public confidence in regulatory decisions. Safety goals will be better 
understood and more readily accepted if they are internationally aligned. 
An area where closer collaboration based on harmonised safety 
requirements will be very beneficial is in quality inspections in construction and 
component manufacturing, where collaboration among regulators is essential to 
an efficient handling of manufacturing oversight issues. 
Benefits for electricity consumers 
Of primary importance is that the benefits for overall nuclear safety as well 
as for regulatory and industry efficiency should ultimately redound to the 
benefit of consumers through the enhanced delivery of safe, affordable, and 
environmentally cleaner electric power. 
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme  
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) is a 
multinational initiative of the regulators from Canada, China, Finland, France, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The IAEA is involved in all generic MDEP 
activities to ensure consistency with its safety standards. The purposes of the 
MDEP are to co-operate on specific design reviews and to explore potential 
harmonisation of regulatory requirements and practices with the overriding goal 
to make new reactors safer. 
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 As individual regulators review new nuclear reactor designs, MDEP aims 
to enhance co-operation among them through sharing resources and knowledge, 
thus improving efficiency and effectiveness of the licensing process. The 
ultimate goal of MDEP, for which OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency has been 
chosen to perform the technical secretariat duties, is to explore the achievement 
of convergence of industry codes, standards and safety goals 
The MDEP regulators interact frequently with other stakeholders such as 
reactor vendors, component manufacturers, mechanical and electrical standards 
development organisations, non-MDEP regulators and regulatory bodies such as 
WENRA, and industry organisations such as the World Nuclear Association to 
obtain important input in carrying out MDEP functions. A key message of the 
MDEP is that each regulator maintains its sovereign right and responsibility 
regarding ensuring the safety of new reactors designed, constructed and 
operated within its borders. 
MDEP may thus be seen as an enabler of increased safety and 
standardisation through potential harmonisation and convergence of regulatory 
requirements and practices. 
4.8. Public acceptance 
Although concerns about security of energy supply and the threat of global 
climate change have tended in recent years to increase public recognition of the 
benefits of nuclear energy, several factors continue to weaken public support in 
many countries. These include concerns about nuclear safety, radioactive waste 
management and disposal, and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Society at large is often reluctant to accept nuclear energy, mainly because its 
benefits are not perceived to outweigh its drawbacks.  
Public acceptance of nuclear energy has suffered of course as a result of 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident. A quarter of the people polled by IPSOS in 
June 2011 (IPSOS, 2011) say their opinion was affected by the accident, and 
this percentage is much higher in South East Asia countries (66% in the 
Republic of Korea and 52% in Japan and China). According to this poll, only 
38% support the use of nuclear energy, though this level of support varies 
greatly from country to country, with over 48% support in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Poland and India, and only 21% support in Germany. 
According to the BBC Globescan poll of November 2011 (BBC, 2011), support 
for new build has also decreased in many countries, though it has increased or 
remained stable in the United Kingdom and the United States. This shows that 
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 there is considerable work to recover a sufficient level of support for nuclear 
energy to enable new projects to be developed.  
Establishing improved communication channels with all stakeholders is a 
necessary step towards promoting better understanding of the risks and benefits 
of nuclear energy, and the role it can play alongside other energy options. 
Beyond this, however, civil society should be engaged in the policy-making 
process for deciding the future of nuclear energy programmes, in the context of 
overall national strategy to meet energy and environmental policy goals. 
Enhancing public involvement in shaping the future of nuclear energy is 
essential to build trust and ensure broad support. 
In addition to nuclear power plants themselves, the siting of related fuel 
cycle facilities can also lead to public concerns and opposition. In particular, 
locating radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities has often become 
highly controversial. In several countries, proposals for such facilities have had 
to be withdrawn in the face of public opposition. 
Lessons have been learnt from such setbacks, and radioactive waste 
management organisations in most countries are now making much greater 
efforts to engage with local communities potentially affected. In some cases, 
notably in Finland and Sweden, this approach has resulted in great progress 
being made towards the implementation of radioactive waste disposal plans. 
Other countries will need to adopt similar approaches as they seek to make 
progress with radioactive waste disposal. 
4.9. Institutional and legal frameworks 
A successful nuclear programme will always require clear and sustained 
policy support from the government concerned. The nuclear energy policy can 
be part of the country’s overall long-term strategy to meet its energy policy and 
environmental objectives, including achieving security of energy supply and 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Examples of countries with such long-
term policies to develop nuclear energy include France, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and, more recently, China. The need for strong policy support applies 
equally whether the electricity supply industry is in the public or private sector. 
No investor would contemplate proceeding with a project to construct a nuclear 
power plant without clear policy support from the government. 
In several cases, nuclear power projects have been delayed or cancelled, or 
operating plants forced to close prematurely, as a result of policy changes 
regarding nuclear power. Given that the construction period of a nuclear plant 
 64
 may include national elections, and that there will be several changes of 
government during the plant’s operating life, there is likely to be a need not 
only for policy support from the incumbent government, but also a long-term 
settled strategy with broad-based political support. 
For countries launching a new nuclear programme, the government will 
need to take a particularly active role. In some countries, the electricity supply 
industry is wholly or mainly under state control, and the decision to proceed 
with a nuclear programme will be taken directly by the government. In other 
cases, the government will need to work closely with the private and public 
sector actors involved to ensure that projects can proceed smoothly. This will 
clearly include establishing the required legal and regulatory frameworks (as 
discussed below), but it will often be necessary for the government to take a 
broader role. 
All countries with a nuclear programme need to have in place an 
appropriate legal framework dealing with nuclear-related matters. This includes 
a system of licensing of nuclear activities and facilities, overseen by an 
independent regulatory body. Other necessary legal provisions include defining 
responsibility for radioactive waste and decommissioning, and establishing a 
nuclear liability regime (which for most countries is done through an 
international convention). Many countries have a specific “nuclear energy act” 
that deals with all aspects of the use of nuclear energy. 
For countries with existing nuclear programmes, that also have existing 
legal and regulatory systems, the main issue in contemplating a further 
expansion of nuclear power is the effectiveness and efficiency with which the 
existing system has worked. There are cases where the licensing system proved 
to be a source of frequent delays in nuclear plant construction. Important 
reforms to the licensing process in the United States, for example, have resulted 
in a one-step licensing process, with construction and operating licences 
combined. 
Beyond enhancing the effectiveness of national regulatory frameworks, 
international co-operation aims at facilitating the licensing of new reactor 
designs across borders. This will be an important factor in support of the 
deployment of nuclear power worldwide, allowing established standardised 
designs to be replicated in different countries with the minimum of changes. 
The MDEP, described above, is an example of international co-operation in the 
field of safety. 
Countries planning new nuclear programmes that do not have an existing 
nuclear regulatory and legal infrastructure have the ability to learn from 
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international best practice. Given that there are different approaches to nuclear 
regulation and legislation among established nuclear countries, new entrants 
have typically adopted the main principles of the country from which they plan 
to acquire nuclear technology. This simplifies the licensing process, as the 
reference plant will normally already have been licensed in its country of origin, 
so a similar regulatory approach should proceed smoothly without the need for 
design changes. 
For nuclear energy to play a significant role in the supply mix worldwide, 
nuclear power programmes will need to be implemented in developing countries 
where most of the increase in energy and electricity demand will occur. The 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants in those countries will 
require technology transfer and capacity building. 
The policies of OECD countries and others with established nuclear 
programmes regarding technical co-operation and assistance in the nuclear field 
will be very important in this regard. In developing and emerging countries 
embarking on nuclear power programmes, it is essential to ensure that the 
necessary regulatory frameworks and legal infrastructures are working 
effectively before the first units are built and commissioned. Clearly, those 
countries involved in exporting nuclear plants to new nuclear countries have a 
particular responsibility to ensure that the necessary legal infrastructure and 
expertise are in place before proceeding. 
There is also an important role here for broader international co-operation, 
including through intergovernmental agencies. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in particular has extensive programmes of technical co-
operation which support its member states wishing to embark on nuclear power 
programmes. At present, the agency is working with several dozen member 
states that are considering a future nuclear programme, within the Integrated 
Nuclear Infrastructure Group (INIG) (IAEA, 2011) and the International Project 
on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) (IAEA, 2010b). 
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 5. Impact of developments in the electricity 
supply system 
In this chapter, the issue of the role of nuclear energy in a future electricity 
grid characterised by a very large share of renewables is addressed. In most 
countries where nuclear represents a small percentage of the electricity 
generation, nuclear power plants are operated in baseload mode. In countries 
with a large share of nuclear such as France, load-following operation of 
nuclear power plants has been developed to complement hydro or other 
technologies as a means to respond to consumption peaks. This chapter shows 
that nuclear can adapt to a likely future where, in addition to variations in 
consumption, the electricity grid has to cope with intermittency in electricity 
production from renewable sources such as wind. Furthermore, it is shown that 
with “smart grids” which level the load, there is still a need for significant 
baseload production which large nuclear units can provide. 
5.1. Nuclear power plants in a future electricity generation system 
The issue of balancing in a future electricity generation system provokes 
the question whether nuclear power stations still have a role to play if balancing 
issues of the grid are taken into account (e.g. Greenpeace, 2011; D’haeseleer, 
2011). Two issues must be addressed in this context: 
• In a world with ample dispersed generation, is there still a need for 
large generating units, with installed power capacities of the order of 
800-1 300 MW? This relates especially to large coal (or lignite) power 
plants – that will need to be equipped in the future with CCS facilities 
– and nuclear power plants, the largest units of which exceed today 
1 700 MWe capacity. 
• Are nuclear power plants flexible enough to be able to cope with the 
balancing requirements if massive amounts of intermittent sources 
(with nearly zero marginal cost) feed into the system, even up to a 
point that supply exceeds demand for certain periods of time?  
The issue of large rotating units characteristic of thermoelectric plants 
(coal, gas or nuclear) in an overall system addresses the point of system inertia 
and damping. System inertia is necessary to avoid too sudden drops of the 
system frequency. Traditionally, this inertia is provided by large “working 
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 horses”, being the turbo-generator units of large power plants distributed over 
the entire interconnected system, and the many millions of rotating electric 
motors. In the future, it is to be expected that many of the rotating motors will 
be connected to the grid through power-electronics kits to allow so-called 
frequency or speed control, meaning that they are no longer directly coupled to 
the synchronised grid. Likewise, many distributed generation sources will feed 
in via power electronics invertors. This means that the system inertia may 
decrease to the extent that the passive damping mechanism will be 
“depreciated”. It is possible, in principle, to mimic virtual system inertia and 
damping with specially designed power-electronic means (Risoe, 2009), but the 
question remains whether this will allow to replace (even partially) the classical 
damping mechanism. Furthermore, even if classical passive damping would be 
replaced by active control mechanisms via some sort of power-electronics 
intermediary, the issue will remain whether this is sufficiently “reliable” in the 
broad sense, since the system might in the end be much more “nervous” and 
less incident robust, so that continued and permanent adjustment would then be 
necessary. As long as all goes well, few problems should arise, but incident 
management would have to resort to a completely different paradigm. The jury 
on this issue is still out, but common wisdom would suggest that the presence of 
a minimal number of large rotating turbo-generators in the system is not a 
superfluous luxury. On the contrary, the presence of such large units might 
expedite the future penetration of large amounts of “perturbing” intermittent and 
non-dispatchable units. 
Having made the case for large rotating masses, can nuclear plants then 
still play a role in that context? Is it not sufficient to have coal-fired plants or a 
multitude of CCGTs? Both coal-fired plants and gas-fired plants will have to be 
equipped with CCS in a carbon-constrained world. The flexibility of some of 
these CCS-equipped units might be hampered so that their part of the mix may 
have to be limited (Martens, 2010). Furthermore, if one were to ban both 
nuclear plants and coal plants from the generation mix, and rely entirely on gas-
fired plants, the question of security of supply must be addressed. For security 
of supply reasons, a well-balanced distribution of generation means seems 
justified, as e.g., demonstrated through portfolio considerations when 
instantaneous power delivery and not annual energy amounts are considered 
(Delarue, 2011). From the system inertia point of view, there is no reason why 
large nuclear units should not be welcome as part of the mix, quite the contrary.  
The second allegedly thorny issue is that of the balancing flexibility of 
NPPs. In most instances, nuclear power plants have always been run in 
baseload, simply because of their cost structure: large investment cost and low 
variable cost. Economic logic clearly dictates that such plants should run as 
much as possible, perhaps the whole year (minus some time for scheduled 
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 maintenance). Most nuclear power plants have been optimised to run in that 
baseload mode. This does not mean, however, that NPPs are technically unable 
to do load-following. In France, with a large installed nuclear capacity (of about 
63 GW in 2009), a considerable fraction of the NPPs participates in load-
following. In the French fleet, the power gradients of the participating NPPs are 
up to 5% per minute in the power range of 30% to 100% of the rated power 
(Ludwig, 2010; NEA, 2011). At the time of commissioning, it was shown that 
the German NPPs were able to deal with power gradients of 10%/min. But, 
according to Luwdig (2010), the existing German NPPs have over the years 
been modified and optimised for baseload operation, leading to a decreased 
margin for load-following (by means of control rod adjustment). Nevertheless, 
there is no technical problem for the existing German PWRs to absorb the 
currently desired power gradients of 2%/min (meaning about 25 MW per 
minute). As a matter of fact, negative gradients (i.e. downward regulation to be 
able to temporarily absorb massive wind power injection in the system) of 
PWRs can be implemented at almost any rate over the whole range up to a hot 
standstill or island operation. For BWRs, because of the possibility to modify 
power output through flow control by means of the circulation pumps, gradients 
of up to 100 MW/min between 60% and 100% of the nominal power are 
possible. Below the 60% power output range, BWRs can be modulated also via 
control rod adjustment, leading to an overall modulation range of 20%-100% of 
the nominal power. The ramping-rate values for PWR (and BWR) are in line 
with those quoted by the VGB Scientific Advisory Board (VGB, 2010), which 
gives ramping rates of 5%/min (even faster than CCGTs). In summary, load-
following does not seem to be a problem technically; such fluctuating operation 
might, however, possibly have consequences for the durability of some 
components and the operational lifetime of the plants. 
With regard to load-following, convincing computer simulations have been 
provided by Hundt (2009), in which it was shown that the existing German 
NPPs would be able to absorb large power swings caused by massive renewable 
power injection by 2030 (up to 40% renewable electricity generation). 
Furthermore, it was shown that large storage facilities, or wind power 
curtailment, would be needed if one were to assume a speeded up renewable 
generation of 50% renewable electricity by 2030, to avoid a generation surplus 
(Hundt, 2010). 
It must be stressed that the above analyses apply to existing power plants. 
Modern nuclear power plants are also designed for load-following operation. 
EPRI’s Utility Requirement Document for Advanced Light Water Reactors, or 
in Europe, the European Utilities’ Requirements (EUR) state that modern 
reactors should have significant manoeuvrability capability and be able to 
operate in the load-following mode, as well as take part in the primary control 
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 of the grid (frequency stabilisation) (NEA, 2011). If needed, operational 
procedures and design margins for new NPPs could be modified so as to further 
improve load-following capabilities. At any rate, the fuel for such plants is 
designed to avoid limitations on the rate of power increase for hot and cold 
start-ups, so there are no fundamental operational or safety limitations on the 
load-following capabilities of NPPs. The problem for new NPPs will be of an 
economic nature. Load-following of a NPP means that its capacity factor (or 
load factor) will be less than optimal, leading to a more expensive cost of 
generating electricity for that plant. Additional “wear and tear” is also expected 
if the plant operates in load-following mode, which will result in slightly higher 
maintenance costs for the plant’s equipment. 
As a final point, it is interesting to mention that liberalised markets based 
on a marginal-cost pricing system will be faced with problems if massive power 
injection of almost zero-marginal-cost generation takes place. Such massive 
injection might lead to zero and even negative spot prices in particular control 
areas. With such price structure, nobody would be interested to invest in 
balancing capacity. The (whole) market design of liberalised markets will have 
to be reconsidered, e.g. to include capacity payments into the pricing system. In 
regulated markets, whereby pricing is based on an overall cost-plus principle, 
this is less of an issue. 
It must be stressed that a good understanding and insight in the functioning 
of the overall generation system is crucial but not a straightforward exercise. 
Careful modelling is required to fully grasp the dynamic interactions occurring 
in the system (Delarue, 2009). After all, power plants face a multitude of 
technical constraints, characterised by typical indivisibilities (like minimal 
operating points), resulting sometimes in an unexpected outcome. 
5.2. Nuclear power and “smart grids” 
In 2009, electricity (including heat) accounted for 41% of global GHG 
emissions in the energy sector (IEA, 2011a), although it represented only 17% 
of the total final energy consumption (IEA, 2011b). This underlines the need to 
improve the efficiency of the whole electricity system, including production, 
delivery, and consumption and the need to evolve towards low-carbon 
technologies in the electricity production. 
The term “smart grids” has many definitions and interpretations, 
depending on the specific country, drivers and outcomes. It generally refers to 
the entire power grid, including the generation, transmission, and distribution 
structure, as well as electricity consumers. 
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 Smart grids focus mainly on the efficiency of the electricity system 
encompassing both supply and demand aspects, which results in GHG 
emissions reductions. Figure 5.1 shows an example of a smart grid concept. 
Figure 5.1: Concept for smart grid for electricity supply 
  Source: MEF, 2009. 
The expected benefits of an electricity supply system which follows the 
smart grid concept, include: 
• the reduction of energy loss through the optimisation of power flow; 
• the load levelling (see Figure 5.2) by the rational consumer response 
to electricity rates. This leads to: 
− decreasing the fluctuation of electric load and hence decreasing 
the maximum generating capacity required to meet peak demand; 
− increasing the proportion of baseload power plants; 
• the increase of renewable and distributed generation sources. 
In such systems, energy storage (via pump storage, or compressed air 
storage or even through batteries in electric vehicles) will gain in importance, 
and play a major role in homogenising the fluctuating electrical generation from 
renewable energies. 
The optimal power mix in the electric supply system is the one that 
minimises the total costs (fixed and variable costs). The fixed costs comprise 
 73
 mainly construction and O&M costs, and variable costs correspond mainly to 
the fuel cost. The variable costs and generation amounts by electricity-
producing units are usually calculated by considering the plants’ technical and 
economic variables on the supply side and a load duration curve on the demand 
side, resulting in the so-called “merit order” of each unit in the electric system. 
(The merit order is a way of ranking power generation units, in ascending order 
of their short-run marginal costs of production, so that those with the lowest 
marginal costs are the first ones to be brought online to meet demand, and the 
plants with the highest marginal costs are the last to be brought on line.) 
As for the generation cost structure on the supply side, nuclear plants are 
highly capital-intensive compared to other conventional energy sources such as 
coal- and gas-fired plants, though the nuclear fuel cost is comparatively very 
low (about 10% of total generation cost). Therefore the more electricity nuclear 
power plants generate, that is, the higher the load factor, the better its economics 
becomes comparatively thanks to the relatively low variable (or fuel) cost. 
As for the load curve on the demand side, since the electric loads are 
usually fluctuating continuously between the maximum and minimum loads, the 
specific power plants to meet the medium and peak loads, which are 
economically competitive only under the comparatively medium and low 
generations for the period, are also needed in the electric system in order to 
minimise the total electric system cost. In addition, the shape of load duration 
curve characterised by an average load rate and min/max load ratio also plays 
an important role in determining the generation shares by each electric 
technology in the system. 
Nuclear, coal and hydro (in some countries) are often classified as 
baseload power plants with comparatively high capacity factors and natural gas 
power plants are used for peak loads with lower capacity factors over the 
period. 
Smart grids technologies will be able to flatten the shape of the present 
load duration curve (LDC) thanks to the effect of the consumer response to 
price signals from generation plants (see Figure 5.2). This flattening 
phenomenon in LDC leads to a demand increase for baseload power plants, and 
simultaneously, to a decrease of demand for peak load or even medium load 
generation. 
In conclusion, some of the present peaking/medium power plants could be 
substituted by baseload power plants. However, since coal power plants emit 
CO2, nuclear power’s position and share within the electric system could 
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 increase significantly on the premise that nuclear remains very competitive 
compared to other energy technologies. 
Figure 5.2: The potential effect of a smart grid on the load duration curve 
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 6. Longer-term perspectives for nuclear energy 
In this chapter, the long-term perspectives for nuclear energy are reviewed, 
from the point of view of reactor technology evolutions (e.g. Generation IV 
reactors, or small modular reactors), new market applications which could 
develop in a low-carbon energy future (e.g. non-electric applications such as 
desalination or fabrication of synthetic fuels to substitute fossil fuels), as well as 
from the point of view of new operational constraints related to climate change 
or regulations (e.g. availability or regulation concerning cooling water for 
power plants).  
6.1. Generation IV nuclear systems 
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) was initiated in 2000 and 
formally established in the middle 2001 with nine countries. It is an 
international co-operative initiative which today has 13 participants to jointly 
develop one or more advanced reactor system. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States are members of 
the GIF, along with the EU (Euratom).  
In 2002, GIF announced the selection of six reactor systems, which are 
regarded to represent the future shape of nuclear energy. These reactors were 
selected out of some hundred reactor concepts and some hundred experts 
contributed to the evaluation. They are claimed to better respond to the social, 
environmental and economic requirements of the 21st century and they promise 
to enhance the future contribution and benefits of nuclear energy. These systems 
employ advanced technologies and designs to improve the performance of 
reactors and fuel cycles as compared with current nuclear systems. They would 
allow meeting increased energy demands on a sustainable basis, while being 
resistant to diversion of materials for weapons proliferation and secure from 
terrorist attacks. The reactors are expected to be ready for deployment around 
2030-2040. 
The following reactor systems were selected for further development. 
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 Sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) 
The SFR has liquid sodium as the reactor coolant, allowing high power 
density with low coolant volume. There are about 400 reactor-years of 
experience with sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors over 5 decades in 
8 countries, and the SFR is the main technology of interest in GIF, with 
prototypes planned in several countries.  
Supercritical-water-cooled reactor (SCWR) 
This reactor evolves from today’s water reactor technology and operates at 
a very high pressure above the thermodynamic critical point of water (374°C, 
22 MPa) to give a thermal efficiency about one third higher than current water 
reactors. The supercritical water (25 MPa and 510-550°C) is planned to directly 
drive the turbine, without any secondary steam system, simplifying the plant.  
Very-high-temperature gas reactor (VHTR) 
These reactors use helium as coolant and graphite as moderator. High-
temperature reactors have been operated in China, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Several reactors are under development, e.g. in 
China, Japan or the United States. Due to the absence of any metallic material in 
the reactor core, outlet temperature of over 900°C can be achieved, which 
allows thermochemical hydrogen production via an intermediate heat 
exchanger, with electricity cogeneration, or direct high-efficiency electricity 
generation with a gas turbine (Brayton cycle).  
Gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR) 
The GFR is a high-temperature helium-cooled fast breeder reactor with 
temperatures of about 850°C. It is suitable for power generation, thermo-
chemical hydrogen production or other process heat applications. The helium 
will directly drive a helium turbine (Brayton cycle) for electricity generation.  
Lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR) 
The LFR is a fast neutron reactor cooled by liquid metal (Pb or Pb-Bi 
eutectic), which operates at low pressure by natural convection (at least for 
decay heat removal). Coolant temperature of 550°C can be achieved today, but 
in the longer term a temperature of 800°C is planned with advanced materials. 
The higher temperature would enable thermochemical hydrogen production. 
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 Molten salt reactor (MSR) 
The MSR has an epithermal neutron spectrum. In contrast to other reactor 
designs with solid fuels the MSR fuel is dissolved in the coolant which 
circulates through graphite core channels. The MSR has a coolant temperature 
of 700°C at very low pressure, with development objectives for about 800°C. 
Electricity generation is done via a secondary circuit, and due to the high-
temperature production of hydrogen is also feasible. 
Three of the six systems (SFR, LFR and GFR) employ a closed fuel cycle 
including the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium, uranium and minor 
actinides to maximise the fuel resource base and minimise high-level wastes. 
The MSR is designed for an epithermal neutron spectrum, and the remaining 
two, the SCWR and the VHTR operate with thermal neutrons like most of 
today’s operating nuclear power plants. 
The fast neutron reactors were originally conceived to burn uranium more 
efficiently (typically producing 30 to 60 times more energy from the same 
quantity of uranium) and breed new fissile fuel in form of plutonium (i.e. fast 
breeder reactors). Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 shows how uranium resources could be 
extended through the use of fast breeder reactors and advanced fuel cycles. 
The high coolant temperatures of some of the Generation IV systems (up 
to 1 000°C for the VHTR) also open the possibilities of developing specific 
non-electric applications of nuclear energy. These are discussed in Section 6.3. 
The Generation IV reactor systems are all in various stages of conceptual 
design, with some systems such as the SFR or the VHTR at a more advanced 
stage than others. These are expected to move into the detailed design phase by 
the middle of the decade if decisions to build prototypes (e.g. ASTRID in 
France for the SFR and the NGNP in the United States for the HTR) are taken. 
The 2010 GIF annual report (GIF, 2010) and the GIF website give an 
overview of the latest developments for these systems (www.gen-4.org).  
6.2. Accelerator-driven systems 
Accelerator-driven systems (ADS) operate by means of an external neutron 
source (created through the acceleration of protons that are smashed into a 
heavy material so as to produce so-called “spallation neutrons”) so that the 
reactor assembly operates sub-critically. Although some ideas were launched in 
the 1990s to operate ADS systems for electricity production (called “energy 
amplifiers”) based on a thermal spectrum and fed by thorium-232, it is the 
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 current understanding that the first generation of ADS should operate with fast 
neutrons and should concentrate on nuclear waste incineration (the so-called 
“partitioning and transmutation” – P&T), with energy production as a useful 
side product. This can reduce the inventory of long-lived isotopes and facilitate 
waste management. At present, a prototype ADS project, the MYRRHA 
project,1 is being investigated in Europe. 
6.3. Small modular reactors 
Commercial nuclear power plants under construction are mostly large 
sized units, with a capacity of more than 700 MWe. But there is also renewed 
interest in the small- (i.e. below 300 MWe) and medium-sized (between 
300 MWe and 700 MWe) category, which is of particular interest to countries 
with small electricity grids, for energy supply to remotely located areas or for 
special applications, such as heat supply for various industrial processes, district 
heating, desalination of seawater, enhanced oil recovery and coal conversion. 
Lower investment cost compared to large nuclear units is also one of the most 
attractive features of such reactors. Currently about 40 reactors in the small- and 
medium-sized category are at different stages of development or design 
(IAEA, web).  
The most recent small reactor designs make extensive use of modularity 
and scalability, hence the abbreviation SMR for small modular reactor used in 
particular in the United States.2 For such reactors, large components can be 
assembled in workshops, and transported by rail, truck or barge to the 
construction site, reducing significantly site assembly work. Scalability means 
that several reactor modules can be added on one site to increase the power 
output of the nuclear power plant, if necessary.  
A recent review of SMR concepts and an analysis of their economic 
competitiveness compared to large nuclear units and other electricity generation 
technologies can be found in NEA (2011). It was shown in this report that in 
                                                     
1. MYRRHA: Multipurpose hYbrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications: 
http://myrrha.sckcen.be. This project has also been selected as the European 
Technology Pilot Plant demonstration for the lead fast reactor (LFR) technology, 
one of the options pursued by Europe’s Nuclear Industrial Initiative under the EU 
SET plan (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/set_plan_en.htm). 
2. The IAEA uses the abbreviation SMR to describe small- and medium-size 
reactors. In this report, SMR refers to small modular reactors, which are advanced 
small-size reactors (typically < 300 MWe) based on modular design and 
construction. None has been built to this day. 
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 markets where large nuclear units cannot be considered, SMRs may be 
competitive compared to fossil or renewable energy sources. 
At present, no such reactor has been built or licensed, though several 
utilities, especially in the United States, have expressed interest in building such 
reactors. 
6.4. Non-electric applications 
The expected shortages of fossil fuels, the prospects of their rising prices 
as well as their uncertain availability have created increased attention to 
substitute forms of energy, which at the same time have less impact on the 
environment. Developing renewables and nuclear for electricity generation, 
together with energy storage and smart grid technologies, could help reduce 
significantly the share of fossil fuel (essentially coal and gas) in electricity 
generation.  
Figure 6.1: Temperature requirements for process heat applications and 
core outlet temperatures of principal reactor lines 
  
    Source: IAEA, 2008. 
But nuclear energy could also address non-electric applications by 
providing both electricity and heat to industrial processes which today use fossil 
fuel. These applications include district heating, desalination, enhanced oil 
recovery, coal conversion, synthetic gas production, oil refining, and hydrogen 
production (IAEA, 2008; von Lensa, 2010). The Figure 6.1 shows temperature 
requirements for various industrial processes and at the same time outlet 
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 temperatures of principal reactor types. For example, water-cooled reactors 
(light water and heavy water) can produce hot water or steam up to about 
300°C. Gas-cooled reactors cooled by carbon dioxide and liquid metal cooled 
reactors can produce process steam up to 540°C, and the high-temperature gas-
cooled, graphite-moderated reactor (HTGR) can produce process heat up to 
950°C. 
Hydrogen production using thermochemical splitting and nuclear heat for 
example is such a process heat application, which could substitute steam 
reforming of natural gas. Use of hydrogen as a transport fuel, or use of 
hydrogen to manufacture synthetic fuels, will depend on the development of the 
“hydrogen economy”. In the long term, if such non-electric applications of 
nuclear energy develop and displace fossil-fuel usages, the contribution of 
nuclear technologies to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions could extend 
beyond the power sector.  
6.5. Adaptation to climate change 
Besides the barriers to the development of nuclear energy that were cited 
in Chapter 4, there are other possible constraints which opponents of nuclear 
energy often cite, especially in the context of evolving environmental and 
regulatory conditions. One such constraint, related to siting, is the availability of 
cooling water for nuclear power plants, especially for those situated along 
rivers. It is well known that nuclear power plants require large quantities of 
cooling water. This is especially true for once-through cooling plants, where 
large amounts of water are withdrawn and then returned to the source. Power 
plants with cooling towers withdraw less water, but consume more than once-
through cooling plants, since a significant part is evaporated. Today’s nuclear 
power plants require more cooling water than coal- or gas-fired power plant per 
kWh produced, essentially because of the lower efficiency of the nuclear 
Rankine cycle (see Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2: Carbon and water intensities of different electricity 
generating technologies 
 
Regulations concerning allowable cooling water heat-up exist to protect 
the environment and the eco-system of the cooling source, and there are 
examples where nuclear power plants have had to reduce their power output to 
limit thermal releases. Other regulations limit the amount of water intake, which 
effectively imposes the use of cooling towers for nuclear power plants, even for 
sites situated near large expanses of water (for instance for the projected Calvert 
Cliff Unit 3 in the United States). In that case, the argument against the use of 
once-through cooling is not concern over the impact of thermal releases onto the 
environment, but the impact of large water withdrawal on the life of fish and 
other wildlife at the filtering screens of the water intake. 
In either case, nuclear power plant technology needs to adapt itself to 
harsher climatic conditions (drought, heat, storms, heavy rain, flooding…) and 
more stringent regulations. This adaptation will call for technological advances 
in cooling technologies, which are also required for other thermal power plants. 
On the reactor side, it should also be mentioned that future nuclear power plants 
(e.g. Generation IV) have higher operating temperatures and higher efficiencies, 
and so will have lower water intensity compared to today’s reactors. A new 
study might be carried out by the NEA to address in detail the technological 
adaptations that nuclear power plants may require to operate in more 
constrained environmental and regulatory conditions. 
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 7. Summary and conclusions 
The generation of electricity from nuclear power does not result in any 
direct emissions of CO2, the most important of the greenhouse gases thought to 
be responsible for global warming. As with all energy sources, there are some 
indirect emissions; these result mainly from fossil fuel use for operations in the 
nuclear fuel cycle. The exact level of these indirect emissions varies according 
to location and the technologies used, but studies described in this report show 
that even in the highest cases they remain more than an order of magnitude 
below the direct emissions from fossil fuel generation, and are comparable to 
the indirect emissions from most renewable energy sources.  
As an established source of low-carbon energy, nuclear power could 
potentially play a vital role in achieving large reductions in CO2 emissions 
while ensuring reliable and affordable energy supplies. This is illustrated by 
scenarios such as the International Energy Agency’s Blue Map scenario, which 
models a 50% cut in energy-related CO2 emissions. It includes around 
1 200 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2050, or some 24% of global electricity 
supply. This presumes that a large-scale and broadly-based expansion of nuclear 
capacity will take place, such as occurred during the first major nuclear 
expansion of the 1970s and 1980s. 
It is clear from this and other scenarios that nuclear energy could make a 
major contribution to future cuts in CO2 emissions if it is able to provide around 
one-quarter of global electricity supply by 2050. To reduce CO2 emissions from 
electricity supply by over 90% by 2050 would require this nuclear expansion to 
occur alongside an even more rapid expansion of renewable energy capacities, 
the large-scale introduction of carbon capture and storage technology at fossil-
fuelled power plants, and major improvements in energy efficiency. 
Nuclear presently provides around 13.4% of global electricity, a figure 
which has been in decline in recent years as its growth has not matched the 
overall growth in electricity supply. Although this decline may continue for a 
few more years, the significant upturn in nuclear plant construction starts that 
was observed between 2008 and 2010 could indicate a halt in the decline in 
nuclear share of total electricity production. In 2011, the number of construction 
starts dropped to 4 from 16 in 2010, possibly as a combined effect of the 
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 Fukushima Daiichi accident and the economic crisis. It is too early to assess the 
trend in 2012, but it is worth noting that for the first time in more than 30 years, 
the United States has decided to launch the construction of new nuclear build, 
with the Combined Construction and Operating Licences being granted by the 
US NRC for 4 Generation III+ reactors in 2 sites. 
However, for nuclear energy to provide a growing share of global 
electricity by 2020 and beyond, the pace of nuclear construction would need to 
further increase in the next few years. Hence, the key question for the future of 
nuclear energy is whether it can expand quickly enough over the next decades 
to provide a growing share of total electricity supply as the use of fossil fuels is 
cut back in order to reduce CO2 emissions. 
The analysis in this study indicates that to meet the capacity milestones 
mentioned above towards a nuclear capacity of 1 200 GWe in 2050, new 
nuclear power plants would need to be built at the rate of close to 16 GWe per 
year over the current decade to 2020. This is a little greater than the rate that 
was observed at the end of 2010, when 63 GWe was under construction 
(equivalent to an annual rate of about 13 GWe, assuming a 5-year construction 
period). Given that there clearly remains some under-utilised capacity for 
nuclear construction (for example, in the United States), it would appear that 
achieving an installed nuclear capacity of around 512 GWe by 2020 is certainly 
feasible with a gradual build-up of industrial capabilities and human resources. 
The rate of nuclear construction would need to grow to around 20 GWe per 
year on average in the 2020s if capacity is to reach around 685 GWe by 2030. 
Reaching a capacity of 900 GWe by 2040 would require that the rate of nuclear 
construction rises to an average of around 36 GWe per year in the 2030s as 
many existing plants retire, on the assumption that a 55-year lifetime will 
typically be achieved for existing light water reactors. A further increase in the 
average construction rate to 42 GWe per year would be needed in the 2040s to 
reach a capacity close to 1 200 GWe by 2050. 
Hence, lifetime extensions for the existing rector fleet would help nuclear 
capacity to grow strongly until 2030, as new start-ups would mainly represent 
additional capacity. However, in the 2030s and 2040s the rate of retirements is 
likely to rise strongly, meaning that much new capacity would simply be 
replacing older plants. In other words, the rate of nuclear construction would 
need to increase markedly after 2030 if total nuclear capacity is to continue to 
grow strongly in the face of increasing retirements. Hence, the growth of 
nuclear capacity could slow after 2030 unless there is a strong upturn in new 
construction at that stage. 
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 Factors affecting nuclear expansion 
The study has not identified any insurmountable barriers to an expansion 
of nuclear generating capacity on the scale required over the next 40 years. 
However, despite the clear opportunity for nuclear energy to expand as the use 
of fossil fuels is cut back, many challenges to such a rapid expansion remain. If 
nuclear energy is to realise its full potential, then governments and the nuclear 
and electricity supply industries would need to successfully address these. 
Progress in the near future, to around 2020, will to a large extent set the 
scene for a potentially more rapid expansion in the following decades. 
Decisions and actions in the next few years, or the lack of them, will have an 
important impact on the longer-term development of nuclear generating 
capacity. Thus, it is important that an early start is made if nuclear capacity is to 
grow strongly in the 2020s and beyond. 
The principal challenges for nuclear expansion over the next ten years 
include: 
• The difficulties of financing the high capital costs of nuclear plants, 
especially given the risk of delays and cost overruns with first-of-a-
kind plants and in countries with no recent experience of nuclear 
construction. 
• Overcoming current constraints on industrial capacities and human 
resources for the construction of nuclear plants. 
• Recovering pre-Fukushima levels of public acceptance of nuclear 
energy, by addressing people’s concern over the safety of nuclear 
power.  
• Demonstrating the safe management of radioactive wastes, and 
implementing plans for the disposal of long-lived high-level waste. 
• Introducing nuclear capacity into additional countries while avoiding 
the proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. 
• Increasing the supply of nuclear fuel in line with the expansion of 
nuclear capacity, and ensuring reliable fuel supplies during reactor 
lifetimes of 60 years. 
The regulatory reviews that were ordered in countries operating nuclear 
power plants after the Fukushima Daiichi accident are expected to result in 
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 additional requirements on nuclear plant designers and operators. This could 
lead to delays and increased costs for nuclear construction projects, though it is 
too early to quantify these impacts. At the same time, it could be beneficial to 
public acceptance of nuclear power by showing that safety suffers no 
compromise, and remains the highest priority for governments, regulators and 
operators. 
Another important factor that could affect the future of nuclear energy but 
which is not discussed in this report, is likely to be the potential availability of 
much greater reserves of natural gas than previously thought. This would 
directly affect gas prices, and therefore the competitiveness of nuclear power. 
Natural gas is a very flexible fuel for power generation, and gas-fired plants can 
be built quickly and with a relatively modest capital investment. Burning 
natural gas produces less CO2 at the power plant than coal or oil burning, and it 
is sometimes seen as a quick way to achieve some reduction in CO2 emissions. 
However, a widespread increase in the use of gas for electricity production will 
limit the reduction in emissions that can be achieved. Furthermore, significant 
amounts of methane, a potent greenhouse gas, may be released during gas 
production and transport. Security of energy supply may also be of concern to 
countries relying on imported gas.  
In the longer term, other issues may come to the fore. Nuclear energy is 
today a source of baseload electricity, i.e. nuclear plants are mostly in operation 
constantly at full power. In a largely decarbonised electricity supply system 
(containing mainly renewables, nuclear energy and fossil fuel plants with CCS), 
nuclear plants may increasingly need to adapt their output to complement that of 
intermittent renewable, and it was shown that reactors do have load-following 
capabilities. The gradual introduction of smart grids at both transmission and 
distribution levels will also impact the demands on generating plants. New 
designs of nuclear plant will thus need to take account of these changing 
requirements. 
There is also potential for nuclear energy to meet energy requirements 
beyond its established role in large-scale grid electricity supply. Designs for 
small modular reactors are being developed that could allow nuclear energy to 
be introduced in locations where existing grid infrastructure is inadequate for a 
large-scale plant, or in remote communities that are isolated from grid 
connections. In addition, some new designs will be capable of producing the 
high temperatures needed for direct use in industrial processes, such as in 
chemical plants, displacing fossil-fuel burning. 
The continued development of nuclear technology, including 
Generation IV reactors and fuel cycles, holds the promise of extending the 
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 resources available for nuclear energy by between 30 to 60 times or more, 
potentially providing low-carbon energy for several thousand years. Some of 
the new fuel cycles consider the recycling of minor actinides, and they could 
offer significant reductions in volumes and heat load of long-lived radioactive 
waste. Generation IV reactors are aiming at improved safety and performance, 
as well as increased proliferation resistance. Of course, important technical and 
organisational challenges will have to be overcome before this can begin to be 
achieved, but research and development programmes now underway aim to 
fully demonstrate such technologies over the next 20 to 30 years. 
Responding to the challenges 
A successful nuclear programme in any country must have the confidence 
of society as a whole. Nuclear plant operators are responsible for ensuring they 
achieve high standards of operational safety and performance. This must be 
backed up by strong and independent regulatory authorities. Furthermore, 
transparency and public involvement in decision-making are vital to ensure 
public acceptance for nuclear programmes. This encompasses issues such as 
radioactive waste management and disposal, nuclear safety, and avoiding the 
proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. 
In common with other studies, this report notes that strong and sustained 
government policy support is a prerequisite for nuclear expansion. Governments 
must also create the appropriate legal, regulatory and market conditions in 
which investment in new nuclear capacity can take place if they intend to rely 
on the nuclear option. They must work with industrial partners to ensure that the 
decision-making and regulatory processes work effectively and efficiently. 
Harmonisation of regulatory requirements between countries would have 
important benefits, helping to reduce construction times and costs by allowing 
near-identical plants to be built in many countries. 
It clearly makes good economic sense for energy supplies to be provided in 
the most cost-effective manner, including the cost of carbon emissions reductions. 
This can potentially be pursued through government planning and/or control of 
energy supply systems and industries, or through the development of open and 
competitive energy markets with mainly private-sector participants within an 
appropriate legal and regulatory framework. In the latter case, the aim of 
governments should be to create a level playing field for competition, which should 
ensure that the most cost-effective solutions are adopted to the maximum extent. 
There is an important role for government support for new energy 
technologies, including for research and development and for early deployment. 
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However, as such technologies mature they should be increasingly exposed to 
competitive pressures. In the longer term, rather than governments choosing 
particular technologies to support, introducing technology-neutral carbon 
pricing or trading systems is likely to improve the cost-effectiveness of energy 
supply and CO2 emissions reductions. 
In general, low-carbon energy sources are more capital intensive than fossil-
fuelled sources. Hence, achieving large-scale cuts in CO2 emissions will require 
huge investments to be made in all forms of low-carbon energy over the coming 
decades, as well as in improved energy efficiency and in the upgrading of energy 
networks. Ultimately it is energy consumers who must pay for this investment. 
Achieving the most cost-effective reductions will thus be important for maintaining 
public and political support for the move to low-carbon energy sources. 
Although studies have shown that nuclear energy is one of the most cost-
effective sources of electricity on a lifetime cost basis, the scale of investment in 
an individual nuclear power plant, and hence the period required to make a 
return on investment, is generally much larger than for other types of generating 
plant. This creates particular problems for those seeking to finance investment 
in new nuclear plants, driving up the financing costs compared to fossil-fuelled 
generating capacity. This is especially true where such investment is to be made 
principally by the private sector and where competitive electricity markets exist. 
At least in the early stages of nuclear expansion, some form of government 
support for financing costs may thus be required in some cases. 
Decisions to invest in increasing the industrial capacities needed for the 
construction of nuclear power plants, such as facilities for producing large steel 
forgings, are largely based on commercial factors, i.e. investments will take 
place once it is clear that orders will be forthcoming and that the facilities will 
operate profitably. Hence, new capacity may take several years to come into 
operation. Clear and consistent policy support for nuclear expansion will also be 
important in giving investors the confidence to proceed. 
Expanding the skilled human resources needed for new nuclear 
construction will also take place gradually as it becomes clear that the nuclear 
industry offers attractive long-term career opportunities. Again, stability in 
government policy on nuclear energy would help achieve this. But the growth 
of real job opportunities in an expanding nuclear industry is the key to 
stimulating demand for the relevant university courses and technical training. 
This reinforces the point that the capacity for nuclear expansion would take 
some time to increase, and that it is important to develop “momentum” in the 
next few years to create the conditions for a more rapid expansion in later years. 
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